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THE RESTRICTED GIFT LIFE CYCLE, OR WHAT
COMES AROUND GOES AROUND
John K. Eason *
INTRODUCTION
I have been charged with the pleasant task of thinking about spending
money. Of course, the exercise is confined to the intellectual, with no
empirical mandate that might set me upon the path to personally engaging
in that endeavor. Even in the presence of such a mandate, I would be
bound, like the charitable fiduciary, to approach my task with the interests
of others foremost on my mind. In the context of a nonprofit charitable
organization, those "others" would be the class of charitable beneficiaries
towards whom the organization's mission is directed-that beneficiary
class serving as a proxy for the broader public good.
Of course, now that I have subdued my pleasure with the concept of
purpose and the attendant prospect of accountability, I may as well
acknowledge another stakeholder whose interests cannot be ignored when
theorizing about charitable organizations and their missions. I am referring
to charitable donors-those contributors of money and assets in support of
an organization's mission. A given donor's interests become more
pronounced, or at least her objectives become more particularly identifiable,
when the donor makes her contribution in the form of a restricted gift.1 A
restricted gift is one with respect to which the donor has specified certain
* Professor of Law, Tulane Law School; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Florida College of Law Graduate Tax Program (1999-2000). LL.M. (Taxation) 1999,
University of Florida College of Law; J.D. summa cum laude 1992, Duke University School
of Law; B.S. cum laude 1989, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Member: North
Carolina State Bar, North Carolina Bar Association, and American Bar Association.
Formerly with the law firm of Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P.,
Greensboro, North Carolina. Special thanks to Linda Sugin and Fordham Law School for
hosting the Nonprofit Law, Economic Challenges, and the Future of Charities Symposium;
Evelyn Brody for her insight and support; and my able research assistants, Mackenzie
Dismore, Sayde Finkel, Patrick Strubbe, and Jessika K. Johnson.
1. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 400(b) (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007). I
do not mean to suggest that a donor retains an actual interest in the gifted property following
a gift transfer to charity, nor do I intend to address the matter of donor standing to enforce
the terms of her gift should the charity fail to adhere to the donor's restrictions. Id. chs. 4, 6.
The introductory note to chapter 4 explains, "In sum, a gift once made is no longer the
donor's property, and the fiduciaries of a charity must, within the bounds of their duties, be
trusted to exercise their wisdom and discretion in the public interest." With regard to
standing, see also Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties
of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. Corp. L. 655 (1998).
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terms and conditions that are to govern the administration and/or
application of the gifted assets.2 The donor's interests, in this regard,
include a general desire "[t]o be assured [that her] gifts will be used for the
purpose for which they were given." 3 The overriding issue is thus one of
honoring donor intent. As time passes after the inception of the gift, the
issue is often less favorably characterized as one of enduring and potentially
unwise dead-hand control.
I. THE ISSUES IN CONTEXT
In the context of charitable gifts, the classic conflict posits on one side a
preference for subjecting property to the will of the living, who
presumptively will seek to apply that property to its highest, best, and most
currently relevant or "efficient" use. On the other side is an argument often
couched in terms of individual liberty, or more specifically, respect for an
individual's freedom to dictate the terms upon which that individual
chooses to part with her property.4 The conflict is of particular importance
where charitable gifts are concerned, because in that context societal
concessions to charitable donors permit a donor to exercise a degree of
perpetual control over the use of the contributed property in ways that
might otherwise be foreclosed. 5 On the other hand, donors seeking such
2. See, e.g., Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should
Not Curb Board Discretion over a Charitable Corporation's Mission and Unrestricted
Assets, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 689, 701 (2005) (contrasting restricted versus unrestricted gifts
to charity); see also Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 400 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft
No. 4, 2007) ("[T]he use of the term 'restricted gift' in this Chapter refers to gifts to
corporate charities made with specified terms .... ). A gift may also be deemed to be a
restricted one, based upon actions or representations of the charity during the solicitation of
the gift. See Katz, supra at 701; see also Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. ch. 4,
introductory note (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007) ("A gift can be legally restricted because
of actions taken by the charity itself in soliciting the gift, or by terms initiated and drafted by
the donor's attorneys."); Johnny Rex Buckles, When Charitable Gifts Soar Above Twin
Towers: A Federal Income Tax Solution to the Problem of Publicly Solicited Surplus
Donations Raised for a Designated Charitable Purpose, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1827, 1838
(2003). A gift made in response to a charitable solicitation couched in terms of a specific
purpose can also give rise to a restricted gift, even though the restriction emanates from the
soliciting organization itself, and not directly from the donor. Id. at 1838.
3. A Donor Bill of Rights (n.d.), available at
http://www.afpnet.org/content documents/DonorBill of.Rights_-_English.pdf. The bill of
rights is the joint product of the American Association of Fund Raising Counsel, Association
for Healthcare Philanthropy, Council for Advancement and Support of Education, and
Association of Fundraising Executives.
4. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 29 cmts. f-h, reporter's notes (2003) (discussing
this dead-hand debate and citing various authorities).
5. See Ball v. Hall, 274 A.2d 516, 523 (Vt. 1971). In Ball, the court explains,
The State affords various privileges and immunities to a donor who is inspired to
establish a charitable trust which are not available to trusts for private uses. Not
the least of these is the release from the rule against perpetuities and various tax
advantages. Such concessions are founded on the belief that the public interest
derives substantial benefit from such creations.
Id. at 523. As to the freedom granted donors in subjecting charitable gifts to enduring
restrictions, see, for example, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, explaining the application
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control must generally submit to the prospect of judicial modification of the
donor's terms, should future circumstances frustrate the donor's charitable
objectives (or directives)-this being a belated price the donor pays for
recognition of her potentially perpetual directions.
This conflict regarding enduring donor control over property gifted for
charitable uses implicates numerous issues of current relevance to donors
and nonprofit charitable organizations, and those who represent them. Not
surprisingly, these issues, and the possible ways of both addressing and
accounting for their resolution, vary by circumstance. In this essay, I frame
the issues and explore the relevant circumstances by reference to the
particular stage in the life cycle of the donor's restricted gift at which
conflict might arise. That life cycle spans the time from initial negotiation
of the gift to its potential modification or termination due to unanticipated
circumstances.
By viewing particular legal doctrines, scholarly concerns, and practical
options in the context of the life cycle of a restricted charitable gift, I hope
to offer both perspective and insight on the noted dead-hand conflict and
how it might better be avoided, or at least, managed. I also hope to
highlight concerns that guide this conflict and define its parameters, by
examining a few specific considerations that play a notable role at a given
stage in that life cycle. The conflict, again, typically entails some degree of
choice between respecting donor intent, on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, encouraging the ongoing pursuit of a currently relevant charitable
mission through currently appropriate means, even if that pursuit requires a
departure from the donor's specific guidelines. Fundamentally, charitable
organizations' actions with regard to restricted gifts raise issues of both
managerial accountability and managerial autonomy.6
By framing the issues in this manner, I hope to explore a few ideas in
pursuit of the foregoing objectives. First among them is the question of
whether restricted gifts can, in fact, be viewed as having a particular life
cycle comprised of discrete stages. The answer, not surprisingly, is yes, as
elaborated upon in Part II. Second, acknowledging this evolution focuses
attention on specific influences driving the noted dead-hand dynamic at
various stages in that restricted gift life cycle, with resulting implications
for both the donor and recipient organization. These influences and
implications are the subject of Parts III and IV, with particular emphasis in
Part IV upon the fiduciary duties attendant a charitable organization's
management of a restricted gift.
of the rule against perpetuities to charitable versus non-charitable interests. Restatement
(Third) of Trusts § 28 cmt. d (2003). For a further discussion of dead-hand control over
property, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth
Century, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1189 (1985). See also infra Part IV.A.
6. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 2, at 689 ("Sometimes, this gap between the objectives of
a charity's philanthropists . . . and its [trustees or directors] . . . represents a failure of
accountability, as when a charity uses a restricted gift in ways that violate the donor's
explicit instructions.").
2007]
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Finally, the forced effort to evaluate a given influence as relevant to only
one stage in the noted life cycle is difficult to maintain. It is, in other
words, impossible to isolate a particular consideration as playing a limited
role at a single, finite point in the evolution of a charitable organization's
ongoing efforts to accommodate donor directives. This evaluative effort,
however, ultimately highlights the pervasive relevance of each such
influence throughout the organization's dealings with the donor and her
enduring demands. This, in turn, suggests that a more comprehensive
donor and organizational perspective towards their restricted gift dealings
might at all times illuminate more mutually advantageous choices and
opportunities, thus reducing the overall level of conflict throughout the life
of that gift. Demonstrative of these points is the ongoing dispute between
Princeton University and certain descendants of Charles and Marie
Robertson, which is explored more fully in Parts V and VI.7 Further
exploration of such matters, however, first requires a brief explanation of
the restricted gift life cycle as envisioned here. That exploration begins in
the following Part II.
II. THE LIFE CYCLE OF THE RESTRICTED CHARITABLE GIFT
My conception of the life cycle of a restricted charitable gift begins with,
of course, the gift's "birth"-or what we might more sensibly identify as
the conversations that culminate in the negotiation and documentation of
the gift and its terms. This is followed by "adolescence to adulthood," a
time of engagement, growth, and often troublesome willfulness and self-
direction. The reference here is to the period during which the charitable
organization is actively engaged in managing the restricted gift in pursuit of
the organization's broader mission. Finally, we have that less welcome
time when the aging process becomes more critical. We could simply call
7. The Robertson v. Princeton dispute is used here for demonstrative purposes only.
There are many issues raised in that dispute, not addressed herein, but themselves worthy of
scholarly analysis in writings dedicated specifically and exclusively to such issues. The
nature of the fiduciary obligations, if any, owed by a § 509(a)(3) supported organization to a
§ 509(a)(3) supporting organization which it controls, is just one example. See infra notes
83-84 (regarding the relevance of such organizational classifications). Further, it would be
both impossible and off point in the context of this essay to fully explore all facets of the
Robertson litigation, much less to identify, discuss, and evaluate each party's contested
version of matters both factual and legal. The depositions in the noted litigation, for
example, "covered events which took place over a 45 year period... [and the litigation itself
has] generated a massive and complex record, including hundreds of thousands of
documents, more than 140 days of transcribed deposition testimony and not less than 16
expert witness reports." Memorandum from Defendant Princeton's Counsel to author 6 (May
24, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum to author]. Multiple summary
judgment motions are pending as of the date of this writing, and the parties' various briefs
cited herein either include or rely upon a wealth of supporting documentation, with each
party no doubt contesting their opponent's characterization of those documents. I do not
attempt here to resolve or even to explore ad infinitum every allegation and contested matter
in that litigation. Nevertheless, I believe that the selective discussion presented here conveys
an accurate sense of the origins and nature of the dispute that is useful, again, for
demonstrative purposes in relation to the topic at hand.
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this stage "death," but instead we will more optimistically (and in
recognition of legal doctrines like cy pres) refer to it as "reincarnation."
This final stage is that future period when the charity must grapple with
donor goals, restrictions, or mandates that have become difficult, if not
impossible, to comply with due to changing circumstances over time.
Although I refer to this progression as a linear life cycle, there is a strong
measure of a Disney-esque "circle of life" at work with restricted gifts. 8 By
this, I mean that considerations bearing upon the donor-recipient
relationship at any given time will acquire added significance as the
seemingly isolated actions inspired by those considerations reverberate
throughout the period spanning from inception of the gift to its potential
restructuring over time. For example, one of the most often-asserted
arguments in favor of honoring donor intentions (when "reincarnating" the
gift is under consideration) is that, should we fail to pay heed to the donor's
directives, there will be a chilling effect upon future charitable giving (i.e.,
the "birth" of future gifts might be suppressed). 9 Similarly, the initial
negotiation or imposition of gift terms that express the donor's intentions
will thereafter serve to constrain management autonomy throughout the
adult life of the gift, at some point during which management may begin to
question the continuing viability of the donor's restrictions-thus
potentially triggering the whole "reincarnation" dilemma once again.10 The
following Part III begins a more thorough exploration of these ideas.
Il. BIRTH: NEGOTIATING AND DOCUMENTING THE
DONOR'S RESTRICTED GIFT
The negotiation and documentation of a restricted charitable gift is
shaped, in the first instance, by legal concerns emanating from multiple
sources that define the parameters of the parties' dealings. State law
definitions of "charity" and "charitable purpose" represent one such
concern. Federal tax laws also reflect similar concerns. Those same tax
laws further specify the acceptable degree of control that may be retained
8. For information on the pervasiveness of the "circle of life" theme in Disney films
and at Disney parks, and for other cartoons and songs incorporating the "circle of life"
concept, see Circle of Life, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circle-of Life (last visited Sept. 10,
2007). For a more philosophical pictorial treatment of the issue, see David Cohen, The
Circle of Life Rituals from the Human Family Album (1993) (charting rites of passage
across cultures through photographs, including birth and childhood, initiation and
adolescence, marriage and adulthood, death and remembrance).
9. See generally Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. ch. 4, introductory note
(Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007); John K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in
Charitable Naming Gifts: When Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 375, 459-60
(2005).
10. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 430 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 4,
2007) (detailing procedures to be followed when circumstances require the reformation of a
donor's restrictions, and providing also that "[iut is incumbent upon the charity's fiduciaries
to ensure that its assets are productively used. Thus, if the restriction cannot be complied
with ... application of this Section is mandatory").
2007] 697
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by a donor who seeks a charitable contribution tax deduction in connection
with her gift.
These formal considerations, however, hardly confine donors to bare
statements that some identifiable charitable objective is to be pursued.
Contemporary donor-charity dealings at the negotiation/documentation
stage of a contribution-particularly with larger "transformational" gifts-
more and more frequently result in "some really hairy gift agreements.""II
Such agreements typically specify in detail the terms upon which the
donor's gift is to be employed by the recipient organization. Some might
believe that such agreements are both unfortunate and a logical reaction to
publicized disputes evidencing less than stellar organizational adherence to
donor mandates. 12 The trend towards more explicit gift agreements is not
necessarily a negative one, however, even from the perspective of recipient
organizations. 13 This part explores the noted legal constraints as well as
some less formal influences upon, and consequences of, the dead hand's
design.
A. Common Law and Federal Notions of "Charitable"
Our legal system grants certain privileges to those who donate property
for charitable purposes. These privileges generally do not arise when
property is given away to non-charitable beneficiaries or otherwise for
private purposes. Among the advantages afforded charitable donors is the
opportunity to dispose of their property on terms that may govern
indefinitely. 14 Donors are afforded such perpetual control as part of a quid
pro quo exchange, with society at large on the other side of the bargaining
table. More specifically,
In exchange for perpetual donor control, society gets wealth devoted to
recognizably 'public' purposes. Wealth that donors would otherwise pass
to individuals for 'private' purposes is in a sense devoted to the public
11. Stephanie Storm, Donors Add Watchdog Role to Relations with Charities, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 29, 2003, at A8 (internal quotation marks omitted); see generally Alan F.
Rothschild, Jr., The Dos and Don 'ts of Donor Control, 30 Actec J. 261 (2005) ("As part of
this new venture philanthropy, donors attempt to exercise significantly more control over the
donee than in the past."); Debra E. Blum, Donors Increasingly Use Legal Contracts to
Stipulate Demands on Charities, Chron. of Philanthropy, Mar. 21, 2002, at 9 [hereinafter
Blum, Legal Contracts] (discussing examples and ramifications of the fact that "[m]ore and
more donors not only want control over the gifts they make to charity... but they also are
demanding that the terms of that control be put in binding, sometimes exhaustive,
contracts"); Debra E. Blum, Ties That Bind: More Donors Specify Terms for Their Gifts to
Charity, Chron. of Philanthropy, Mar. 21, 2002, at 7 [hereinafter Blum, Ties That Bind]
(same).
12. For descriptions of some of these disputes, see the sources cited in supra note 11.
13. See infra Part 11I.C.; infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
14. See generally John Chipman Gray, Restraints on the Alienation of Property (2d ed.
1895). For a further exposition on the rule against accumulations, the rule against
perpetuities, and perpetual trusts, see generally Karen J. Sneddon, The Sleeper Has
Awakened: The Rule Against Accumulations and Perpetual Trusts, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 189
(2001).
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domain. Thus the restraints the law allows to endure are not wholly
idiosyncratic; they must advance purposes that the courts, as custodians of
the commonweal, certify as publicly beneficial. 15
Conceptualizing restricted gifts as an exchange or bargain emphasizes the
fact that limitations flow in both directions. While the charity is bound in
its use of the gifted property by virtue of having accepted the donor's
restrictions, 16 the donor is likewise limited by the boundaries of what
society regards as "charitable."
There are various articulations of specific purposes that qualify as
"charitable," though both courts and commentators generally acknowledge
that no single enumeration captures the universe of purposes that might
qualify. 17 Nevertheless, it is clear that "[t]he common element of charitable
purposes is that they are designed to accomplish objects that are beneficial
to the community-i.e., to the public or indefinite members thereof .... ,,18
It is likewise clear that there are limits to the idiosyncratic or whimsical
directives that a donor can impose without jeopardizing the charitable
nature of the gift. 19 Among the class of "too idiosyncratic" provisions are
restrictions that tend to divert the use or administration of gifted property
away from the pursuit of some recognized charitable mission to other, non-
charitable purposes, as well as provisions that may be deemed capricious or
frivolous.2 0
Donors may nevertheless impose directives that are not in themselves
charitable, but which nevertheless do not detract from the social benefit that
qualifies the gift as charitable in the first instance. A classic example would
be a gift the terms of which require the perpetual association of the donor's
15. Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 Hastings L.J. 1111, 1114-15 (1993);
see also Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts:
Expanding the Use of Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. Haw. L. Rev. 353, 357 (1999) ("Under this
normative theory, the settlor who establishes a charitable trust is viewed as entering into a
contract with the public ... pursuant to which the trust is given perpetual life in exchange for
the public's right to modify the trust terms, both substantive and administrative ... .
16. See Buckles, supra note 2, at 1831-33.
17. See generally Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.) (enunciating
nonexclusive list of purposes thought to be charitable in nature); Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 465, 506 (1860) ("[A] charity is a gift to a general public use, which extends to the
rich, as well as to the poor.... Generally, devises and bequests having for their object
establishments of learning are considered as given to charitable uses .... All property held
for public purposes is held as a charitable use, in the legal sense of the term charity.");
Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 551, 555 (Mass. 1867) (expounding upon the meaning of
"charity" and "charitable" gift); Morice v. Bishop of Durham, (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 656
(applying the Statute of Charitable Uses); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 (2003)
(echoing the preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses).
18. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 cmt. a (2003).
19. Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1114-15; see also Principles of the Law of Nonprofit
Orgs. §§ 410, 415 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007) (detailing permissible and impermissible
gift restrictions); George Gleason Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 379 (rev. 2d ed. 1991)
("Gifts which ... have no practical result except the satisfying of a whim of the donor are
obviously lacking in the widespread social effect necessary to a charity."); 4A Austin
Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 374 (4th ed. 1989).
20. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 29 cmt. m (2003).
2007]
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name with a particular charitable endeavor-i.e., the charitable naming
opportunity gift.21 Although a naming condition does not itself further any
charitable objective and may reflect personal or even selfish donor motives,
such directives are generally not regarded as unreasonably idiosyncratic or
so pervasive that the gift can only be classified as for private (as opposed to
charitable) purposes.
Directives that could be regarded as contrary to public policy, on the
other hand, either will be ignored or possibly will cause the gift to fail from
the outset. Racial or other discriminatory conditions are a prime example,
and courts have shown increasing willingness to disregard such directives
in their entirety. 22 Even naming gifts can run afoul of this limitation.23
Because public policy is a notably evolving concept, donors should feel
particularly constrained when attempting to restrict a charity to the donor's
own current conception of appropriate public policy by, for example,
delineating a particular (and potentially discriminatory or otherwise
controversial) class of persons as beneficiary of the donor's gift.
So assuming a donor with some desire for retained control, and further
assuming a charitable organization with a preference for unrestricted gifts
that may be applied in such manner and for such purposes as management
determines, common law conceptions of "charitable purpose" establish the
initial boundaries within which donor-charity discussions must occur. The
donor is further constrained by the importation of that concept into the
federal tax laws.24 More specifically, certain tax advantages depend upon
the donor making a contribution of appropriate money or property to an
organization deemed charitable under the tax laws, for a use that can
likewise properly be regarded as charitable.25 Chief among these donor tax
21. See John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable
Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36
Wake Forest L. Rev. 657, 699 (2001); Eason, supra note 9; see also Gibson v. Frye Inst.,
193 S.W. 1059, 1061 (Tenn. 1917) ("[The] effect of a gift determine[s] its character rather
than the motive of the donor."); Bogert, supra note 19, § 366. Although some courts have
mistakenly equated "charitable" to require a particularly unselfish or pure motive on the part
of donors, this view is not correct. Id.
22. See, e.g., Home for Incurables v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 797 A.2d 746 (Md.
2002). For a good discussion of this case, see Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. §
415 reporter's note 11 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007); see also id. § 210 reporter's note 2
("[P]erhaps the least settled area of acceptable charitable purposes involves discriminatory
trusts.").
23. See Alan Finder, Struggling with Ghosts from the Past, Hous. Chron., Dec. 4, 2005,
at A15 (noting prominent southern universities dealing with Confederate naming gifts and
other Confederate imagery). As to the traditional acceptability of naming gifts see generally
Colombo, supra note 21, and Suzanne Muchnic, Geffen Gift: What's in a Name?, L.A.
Times, May 15, 1996, at F1 ("[N]aming buildings and galleries for donors is a long-
established tradition at arts institutions all across the country.").
24. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 575 (1983) (noting that
"entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law standards of
charity," and then proceeding to equate the requirements for tax exemption to those
necessary for donors to receive a charitable contribution deduction).
25. See I.R.C. § 170(a) (2002) (authorizing income tax deduction for "charitable
contribution"); I.R.C. § 170(c) (explaining that "charitable contribution" is a "contribution or
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advantages is the reduction in taxable income that results when a donation
meets the requirements specified by Congress for tax deductibility.
Although a donor need not seek any particular tax advantages in connection
with a contribution to a charitable organization, the practical reality is that
donors typically structure the terms of their gifts so that the transfer will
qualify for the tax advantages granted under the Internal Revenue Code.
Although there are various rules to be met in this regard, the focus here is
specifically upon restrictions a donor might seek to impose in connection
with her gift. As an initial matter, a donor may certainly specify which of
an organization's charitable endeavors she wishes to support with her gift.
A donor might even specify a new venture that she intends to fund with her
gift, and this will not jeopardize her tax deduction as long as that venture is
acceptable to the organization and within the organization's charitable area
of competence. 26 If the donor's restrictions implicate a non-charitable
endeavor or confer a benefit upon some finite class of specified
beneficiaries-such as would be the case where the donor requires that her
children be admitted to a recipient educational organization-the donor's
tax deduction will be denied.27 The recipient organization, moreover, is
itself constrained in such matters, because accepting donor requirements
that cause the organization to deviate from a "charitable" mission that
benefits a charitable class may jeopardize the organization's own favorable
treatment under the tax laws. 28
The parties to a gift negotiation must also be wary when it appears that
the donor is "purchasing" something from the organization, rather than
making a true "gift." If the donor's conditions suggest some return benefit
to the donor, this threatens the availability of a charitable contribution tax
deduction for the donor. More specifically, the donor will only enjoy a
reduction in taxable income to the extent the value given to the charitable
organization exceeds the value of any benefits flowing to the donor as a
gift to or for the use of' certain specified types of entities organized for purposes of
furthering certain specified objectives); I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) (identifying the type of
organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions). A charitable contribution tax
deduction may alternatively be available under gift or estate tax provisions. See I.R.C. §§
2522 (gift tax), 2055 (estate tax).
26. Rothschild, supra note 11, at 262; see also Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs.
§ 405 cmt. e (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007) ("A charity may properly decline a gift rather
than accept a gift with a restriction or condition that is contrary to its purpose or mission, or
that otherwise imposes undesirable burdens.").
27. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 415 reporter's note 4 (Preliminary
Draft No. 4, 2007) ("[I]mpermissible private benefit can, depending on the circumstances,
result in loss of tax deductibility for the donor or even denial (or loss) of tax exemption for
the entity.").
28. See id. Most prominent among these benefits is the exemption from income taxation
and the ability to receive gifts that are tax deductible to donors. I.R.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3); see
also Rothschild, supra note 11, at 262 ("However, if the gift is designated.., for.., a
charitable purpose that is outside [the scope] of the donee organization's mission, the gift is
not deductible.").
2007]
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result of the contribution. 29  So a donor is limited, for example, in
demanding that a recipient hospital provide the donor with certain medical
services as a condition of the donor's "gift." If a donor were to contribute
funds to a charitable hospital under such terms, the value of the medical
services would reduce the value of the "contribution" for tax purposes. 30
Indeed, return benefits insisted upon by a donor may fully negate the
existence of any gift or donation, and in particular negate the possibility of
a gift that is charitable in nature.
Perhaps most relevant when considered in the context of the full life
cycle of a restricted gift are the limitations that the tax laws place upon a
donor's ability to attach "strings" to the gift. A gift with strings attached is
used as shorthand here to indicate a gift as to which the donor either (1)
retains some ongoing, non-fiduciary authority to direct use of the gifted
assets, or (2) retains a right to a return of the assets should the donor's
restrictions be violated. Such strings imposed at the inception of the gift
therefore further implicate both management autonomy over the gift during
the "adolescent/adulthood" stage, as well as the potential for return of the
gift to non-charitable uses should the "reincarnation" life cycle stage ever
be reached.
Retained authority to control the use of gifted property-for example,
ongoing authority to unilaterally select individual beneficiaries of the
donor's choosing-is a classic example of the first type of string that could
result in denial of any tax deduction. 31 This is perhaps just another side of
the "earmarking" prohibition noted above in connection with admission of
the donor's children to a recipient educational organization, though here the
problem is more particularly expressed in terms of a lack of organizational
autonomy. As stated in a ruling on this subject, the test "'is whether the
organization has [such] control of the donated funds, and discretion as to
their use, so as to ensure that they will be used to carry out its functions and
purposes. '"'32 If such organizational control is lacking, the contribution
may not qualify as a completed gift at all, charitable or otherwise. Where
both organizational control and extensive retained donor control are present,
the gift may qualify as charitable, but with the negative consequence of
29. See generally Colombo, supra note 21 (discussing charitable naming gifts and the
concept of quid pro quos as they relate to the laws governing the tax consequences of
charitable gifts).
30. For several additional examples of impermissible private benefits flowing to donors,
see the illustrations provided in Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 415 cmt. b(2)
(Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007).
31. See generally Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472 (1990).
32. John McGown, Jr., Major Charitable Gifts-How Much Control Can Donors Keep
and Charities Give Up?, 91 J. Tax'n 279, 282 (1999) (quoting I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-05-
003 (Nov. 12, 1992)); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.507-2(a)(7) (2006). Such retained rights
might also result in application of the restrictive private foundation rules to the gift, which
could present problems for both the donor and the charitable recipient. McGown, supra, at
283.
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subjecting the administration of the gifted property to the onerous private
foundation rules. 33
The second type of string that donors retain relates to conditional gifts.
A conditional gift is one that includes strings that might pull the gifted
property back to the donor or the donor's heirs upon violation of the
donor's restrictions.34 Such "gifts over" or reversions (upon failure of a
specified gift term) can result in a denial of donor tax benefits unless the
possibility of such a violation occurring is "so remote as to be negligible. '35
This phrase has been defined to mean "a chance which persons generally
would disregard as so highly improbable that it might be ignored with
reasonable safety in undertaking a serious business transaction . . . [or
which is] so ... remote as to be lacking in reason and substance." 36
This standard appears to beg the question to some extent, because if the
prospect of the condition failing is in fact so remote, why bother to
incorporate the drastic remedy of reversion in the first instance? In any
event, one practitioner recently commented that "[t]his is a very high
standard and advisors should counsel prospective donors on the risk[s]
inherent in placing such conditions or reversions on their gifts." 37 This
concern, in turn, invites some direction from the charitable organization
during the gift negotiation. The charity might, for example, suggest
alternative charitable objectives specific to that organization should the
primary donor objective later be fully accomplished or thwarted. Similarly,
some practitioner-commentators have suggested that instead of including a
legally binding restriction that could violate these tax rules, donors might
instead consider a nonbinding statement of desires regarding the use of the
gift.38 On the other hand, donors can seek a measure of accountability by
making the gift conditional, but also directing the gift towards a second
33. Rothschild, supra note 11, at 263.
34. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 405 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007)
(regarding conditions versus restrictions).
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c) (income tax rule), Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (estate tax
rule). For an excellent discussion of the deductibility of conditional gifts, with specific
analysis of the impact of the availability of the cy pres doctrine on the tax consequences of
the condition, see Buckles, supra note 2, at 1861-64.
36. See Briggs v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 646, 656-57 (1979) (interpreting Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-1(e) and Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b)). For some examples of gifts that either fail or
pass this test, see Richard L. Fox, Planning for Donor Control and Other Strings Attached to
Charitable Contributions, 30 Est. Plan. 441, 447-48 (2003).
37. Rothschild, supra note 11, at 262.
38. See, e.g., Rothschild, supra note 11, at 263; Conrad Teitell, Charitable Gifts with
Strings Attached, in The Twenty-Fourth Annual Philip E. Heckerling Institute on Estate
Planning 16-1, 16-25 1601.5 (John T. Gaubatz ed., 1990). For an example of a donor
stating her desire for name recognition as a nonbinding precatory request, see Board of
Trustees of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill v. Heirs of Prince, 319 S.E.2d
239, 241 (N.C. 1984) ("I ask that a suitable recognition of this gift be placed in or on the
building, and it is my hope, without attaching any condition, that the building will be named
the 'Lillian Prince Theatre."'). For a discussion of various control measures a donor might
adopt without running afoul of the rules for contribution deductibility, see Principles of the
Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 415 reporter's note 8 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007).
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charitable organization upon failure of the donor's condition, rather than
back to the donor or her heirs. The dual advantages are, first, eliminating
the risk that the gift will not be deemed charitable (since in no event will the
property go to a non-charitable recipient) and, second, imposing a measure
of accountability by motivating the alternative beneficiary to monitor
compliance with the donor's terms.39 This accountability obtains, of
course, because, should the donor's conditions be violated or fail, the
property would go to the alternative (or monitoring) charitable beneficiary
organization. 40
B. Documenting the Donor's Terms: The Gift Agreement
There is general agreement that today's donors are quite willing to
impose specific terms and conditions upon their gifts to charitable
organizations.4 1 This trend is in part attributable to the growing number of
entrepreneurial donors who are confident in both their views and their
ability to effectively guide an organization towards its mission.42 Credit (or
blame) may also be directed at a number of well-publicized donor-charity
disputes over compliance with the terms of a donor's gift.43 Such disputes
may inspire donors to seek accountability and control through more
detailed, binding gift agreements that include explicit consequences should
the recipient organization fail to adhere to the donor's terms. Donor
awareness of cases, such as that involving the Barnes Foundation, no doubt
also plays a role. 44 In the case of the Barnes Foundation, the courts
obviated the need for compliance with many of the donor's specific
instructions in order to preserve what the court felt was the donor's broader
charitable purpose.45 Many donors are hesitant to cede such control to the
courts, and instead try to provide for various contingencies in the gift
agreement. In any event and whatever the inspiration, today "[m]ore and
more donors not only want control over the gifts they make to charity...
39. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 36, at 448.
40. But see Home for Incurables v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 797 A.2d 746 (Md.
2002) (ignoring a gift over to second charity where court applied cy pres to void a racially
discriminatory condition, thus allowing the first named beneficiary to retain the gift).
41. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., LaVerne Woods, The Emergence of "Venture Philanthropy" Raises New
Tax Issues, 13 J. Tax'n Exempt Orgs. 51 (2001) (discussing the "new breed of
philanthropists").
43. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Jonathan Scott Goldman, Just What the Doctor Ordered? The
Doctrine of Deviation, the Case of Doctor Barnes's Trust and the Future Location of the
Barnes Foundation, 39 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 711 (2005); Ilana H. Eisenstein, Comment,
Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes Foundation and the Case for
Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of Charitable Trusts, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1747 (2003).
45. In re Barnes Foundation, No. 58,788, 2004 WL 2903655, at *19 (Ct. Com. P1. Dec.
13, 2004).
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but they also are demanding that the terms of that control be put in binding,
sometimes exhaustive, contracts. '46
There are, of course, negative ramifications to this movement. First, no
matter how prescient they might believe themselves to be, donors cannot
anticipate all of the future changes that might impact the route best suited to
accomplishing the donors' charitable objectives. In this regard, donor
restrictions by definition reduce the autonomy of those charged with-and
actively engaged in-accomplishing the charitable mission which underlies
the donor's gift in the first place. Tying management's hands in this way
could also stifle creativity and innovation, two hallmarks of the nonprofit,
charitable sector.
C. A More Positive Perspective
Although these and other negative consequences certainly exist and are
worthy of consideration, I prefer to instead focus on the positive. In
particular, this trend towards more detailed documentation of donor
objectives can be managed for the benefit of not only donors, but also the
affected charitable organization and the nonprofit sector generally. First,
and perhaps most obviously, donors and their unique perspectives, goals,
and ideas are universally acknowledged as key contributors to the diversity
and pluralism underlying our robust nonprofit sector.47  Charitable
organizations should therefore approach donor negotiations as a way to
incorporate new (and funded!) viewpoints into their pursuit of a charitable
mission that presumptively appeals to both the donor and the organization's
management. Framing the gift negotiations in this manner, moreover,
should provide some basis for distinguishing the donor's primary objective
and ideas about achieving that objective, from more onerous and
idiosyncratic demands that could easily come to hinder the organization's
accomplishment of the agreed upon mission over time.
Second, early and mutual acknowledgement of difficulties likely to arise
over the restricted gift life cycle should lead to more explicit discussions of
those potential problems.48 This, in turn, should ultimately result in gift
agreements that are better suited to both the donor's and the organization's
long-term objectives. 49 Donors will be encouraged to think beyond the
46. Blum, Legal Contracts, supra note 11; see also Blum, Ties That Bind, supra note 11
(expressing similar sentiments and discussing real-world examples).
47. James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwarz, Nonprofit Organizations, Cases and Materials
43-60 (3d ed. 2006).
48. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 405 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 4,
2007) ("The parties should consider including provisions in the gift instrument setting forth
circumstances under which the charity might relax or release the restriction or condition, as
well as the donor's wishes for modification, so that the charity would not be required to seek
court modification .... ).
49. Eugene R. Tempel, Donor Intent: Principles of Documenting a Gift, Nonprofit
Times, Feb. 1, 2003, at 30 (noting that the publicized disputes "provide an opportunity for
nonprofit professionals to reflect upon some key principles for discussing potential gifts with
donors").
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particular task or isolated accomplishment that might be driving their
reluctance to relinquish control. Recipient organizations, in turn, can use
this conversation to emphasize how the specific object of the donor's
interest is both supported by, and essential to, the organization's broader
mission. By incorporating that broader mission into the statements
embodying the donor's specific directives, the donor is challenged to
consider the breadth of her interest, and the organization receives both
guidance and a measure of flexibility should the donor's specific directives
later become problematic.
Suppose, for example, that a philanthropist wishes to make a significant
contribution to a university hospital's organ transplant unit in recognition of
her experience with that unit during a past family illness. Because of her
respect for the generosity of anonymous organ donors and the shortage
thereof, this philanthropist expresses a very specific desire to fund the
staffing and facilities to be utilized by future organ donors in connection
with the hospital's transplant activities. But what if science ultimately
progresses to the point of growing new organs from the infirm's own
genetic materials, without the need for organ donors at all? The genetics
will no doubt be challenging, the problem of organ failure will still exist,
and surely the philanthropist would like for her gift to remain both relevant
and helpful over time. 50
At the gift agreement negotiating table, the recipient organization is
presumptively at the forefront of the philanthropist's charitable intentions.
This presents the recipient organization with a unique opportunity not only
(1) to applaud the donor for her generosity and the merits of her specific
objectives, (2) to express the organization's pleasure at being a conduit for
her generosity, but also (3) to encourage the philanthropist to envision the
ongoing good her generosity might foster over time within the inevitably
changing environment in which her objectives will be pursued. Again, the
organization can present this latter idea in the specific context of the
recipient organization's own mission and particular areas of competence.
With regard to the foregoing hypothetical philanthropist, for example, the
hospital might discuss its likely (or desired) position as a future leader in
genetic engineering research, and in particular the application of that
research to organ and tissue regeneration. Note also that this "negotiating
table" setting allows the charity to frame the issue for the donor's
consideration: the charity can guide the discussion along lines not so
negatively focused on "what if we can't achieve your goal any more," but
rather "what if we get so much better at accomplishing your goal that we
need to pursue it, or possibly even define it, differently?"
Such a dialogue should facilitate the incorporation into the gift agreement
of some reference to the recipient organization's broader purposes as they
relate to the philanthropist's more fully conceived but specifically stated
objectives. Competent advisors on both sides of the table will no doubt be
50. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 357.
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able to articulate this understanding to immediate and long-term advantage
of both the philanthropist and the recipient organization. After the
discussion noted in the foregoing hypothetical situation, for example, a
reversionary interest in favor of unknown future heirs or a wholly unrelated
alternative charitable beneficiary should appear at best unnecessary, and at
worst, wholly inconsistent with the donor's overriding reason for coming to
the negotiating table with this recipient organization in the first instance.
D. Birth, Mission, and Duties
Discussion of the "birth" of a restricted gift will conclude here by
recognizing that in evaluating the acceptability of a donor's offer to make a
restricted gift, management must from the outset act both honestly and with
a desire to further the organization's charitable mission. This obligation
resides in ethical standards, principles of professional practice, and the
various legal duties that govern nonprofit management conduct and
decision making. 51 Principles of professional practice directed at nonprofit
management, for example, call for the adoption of specific guidelines to
govern the decision as to whether acceptance of a particular gift is in the
organization's best interest.5 2 Such pronouncements also clearly state that
management should decline gifts when the terms command action outside
the scope of the organization's mission or which could otherwise lead to
"adverse consequences." 53 Equally clear is that an organization should not
assume that a donor's ill-fitting restrictions can eventually be tailored to fit
the organization's needs. In this regard, "[i]t is unethical to accept a gift
with the hope that [the recipient organization] can later change the donor's
mind about its use."'54 In other words, once an organization accepts a
donor's contribution and its accompanying terms, the organization must
strive to honor the donor's intentions as both a matter of professional
practice and ethical obligation.
Following an organization's receipt of a contribution subject to agreed
upon restrictions, the organization's focus necessarily shifts towards
employing the gifted assets in furtherance of the organization's charitable
mission. At the outset, this should not present any particular problems if
5 1. As one commentator puts it, "It is unethical to accept a gift with the hope that you
can later change the donor's mind about its use." Tempel, supra note 49.
52. See, e.g., Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Principles for Facilitating Legal Compliance
and Public Disclosure para. 26 (n.d.), available at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/selfreg/All-Principles-Revised.pdf; see also Principles of the
Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 415 cmt. b(l) (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007).
53. Minn. Council on Nonprofits, Principles & Practices for Nonprofit Excellence 12
(fund-raising) para. 10 (2005) [hereinafter "MCN"], available at
http://www.mncn.org/info/principles-and-practices.pdf, see also Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Orgs. § 415 cmt. b(2) (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007).
54. Tempel, supra note 49, at 31; see also MCN, supra note 53, at 12 (fund-raising)
para. 4; Association of Fundraising Professionals, Code of Ethical Principles and Standards
of Professional Practice nos. 9, 11, available at http://www.afpnet.org/ka/ka-
3.cfm?content itemid= 1068&folderid=897 (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
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the organization's management has acted responsibly in accepting the
donor's terms, as just noted. Of course, this relationship between the proper
acceptance and later utilization of a restricted gift demonstrates the sieve-
like nature of segregating various dead-hand influences into a given stage in
the life cycle of a restricted gift. Nevertheless, I will continue to employ
that framework for exploring the broader point-namely, that a more
comprehensive appreciation of these circular influences at any given point
in the restricted gift life cycle should ultimately inspire decisions that serve
to reduce the overall level of tension embodied in this restricted gift, dead-
hand dynamic. In this vein, then, let us move forward to that period during
which the organization employs the donor's restricted gift in furtherance of
the organization's mission, but in accordance with the gift terms.
IV. ADOLESCENCE TO ADULTHOOD: MANAGING THE RESTRICTED GIFT
Two aspects of managerial responsibility threaten compliance with donor
intent once the organization proceeds to employ the donor's gift in
furtherance of the organization's mission.5 5 The first concerns managerial
competence in managing the gifted assets so as to effectively carry out the
intended charitable mission. The second also involves a degree of
competence, but in many cases, managerial integrity and perhaps judicial
inclinations characterize the issue. More specifically, this second concern
relates to the organization's potential need (or desire) to depart from the
particular gift restrictions that express the donor's intentions. It is this
second concern that drives the exploration here, but since managerial
oversight is implicated in either case, the relevant fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty, and perhaps obedience are central to the discussion in this Part IV.
A. Fiduciary Duties
In defining the fiduciary duties that govern charity management, an
initial question is whether management in a particular case should be
subjected to traditional trust law standards of conduct or the more lenient
corporate standards imported from the realm of for-profit enterprises. With
regard to restricted gifts, the answer is, to varying degrees, yes on both
counts. 56  Authorities generally agree that regardless of whether the
organization exists as a charitable trust or charitable corporation, restricted
gifts give rise to trust (or in the case of a corporation, trust-like) duties-in
particular, a duty to abide by the terms of the gift.57 This is so even though
55. See William Schwartz & Francis J. Serbaroli, After the Barnes Ruling: What Donors
Should Do to Protect Their Wishes, Chron. of Philanthropy, Mar. 31, 2005, at 55 (explaining
that "challenges to carrying out a donor's wishes may arise at two levels").
56. See, e.g., Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 200 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft
No. 4, 2007), quoted in infra text accompanying note 59.
57. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 cmt. a (2003) (explaining that a contribution of
property to a charitable organization that is restricted to a particular purpose is generally
regarded as creating a charitable trust, regardless of whether the recipient organization is
organized as a trust or corporation); Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 47, at 127 ("If property
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in the charitable corporation context no trust technically exists. 58 The most
recent draft of the American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Organizations explains this synthesis as follows:
Among the most important potential differences between charitable
trusts and nonprofit charitable corporations are fiduciary standards and
consequences for breach[,] ... [levels of] decisional autonomy for the
governing board[,] and supervisory regimes. In these three important
areas, however, trust and corporate law have been conforming, with the
general result that corporate fiduciary standards of conduct are being
applied to both charity trusts and members of a nonprofit board ... ; trust
doctrine applies to modifying restrictions on gifts ...; and regulators
have the same enforcement powers regardless of a charity's
organizational form ....
• . . [T]hese Principles continue trends promoted by other reform
projects to minimize the legal differences in organizational form where
appropriate .... Notably, a trust instrument cannot be varied without
judicial approval (unless the instrument grants the trustee authority to
make the desired amendment), whereas the corporate board . .. [has]
greater autonomy in adjusting to unanticipated circumstances (with
protection for restricted gifts). 59
is given for a particular charitable purpose and the [recipient] corporation dissolves or
changes its purposes ... [tihe more restrictive common law cy pres or deviation [trust]
doctrines will apply and the property will pass to a charitable corporation that meets those
stricter standards."); Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations:
Federal and State Law and Regulation 438-40 (2004) ("The doctrine of cy pres ... [is]
applicable ... in forty-nine states to charitable trusts and to charitable corporations .... ");
Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 Chi.-Kent. L.
Rev. 641, 642 (2005) ("When it comes to enforcing restrictions on gifts-even those made to
corporate charities-regulators and courts commonly apply charitable trust doctrines.");
Katz, supra note 2, at 696 ("[A] charitable corporation's board of directors has more
discretion [than would trustees of a technical trust] over its charity's mission and assets,
except for restricted gifts, which are held in trust."); see also infra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text. A contribution of property to a charitable organization, where the use of
the property is restricted to a particular purpose, can therefore be regarded as creating a
charitable trust at least with respect to the strict nature of the duties' attendant adherence to
the donor's restrictions, regardless of whether the recipient organization exists in trust or
corporate form.
58. With regard to there being no "technical" trust in existence where a restricted gift is
held by a nonprofit corporation, see, for example, Revised Model Nonprofit Corporations
Act § 8.30(e) & official cmt. 1 (1987) (providing that a director shall not be deemed to be a
trustee, but that the corporation may nevertheless be deemed to hold such property in trust).
Id. § 11.07 official cmts. (providing that charitable corporation's may merge, but noting that
the surviving corporation is still bound by the terms of any restricted gifts); see also
Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 400 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007)
(noting that a corporation would not be bound by trust law procedural requirements, such as
those requiring the provision of information to beneficiaries); id. § 240 cmt. c ("[C]orporate
directors have the legal power to amend the articles of incorporation,.., in contrast to the
inability of a trustee unilaterally to amend the terms of the trust .... ).
59. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 200 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 4,
2007).
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In other words, the more relaxed corporate standards of conduct should
govern managerial decisions that relate to preserving or utilizing the gifted
assets, where such decisions do not otherwise implicate a departure from
the donor's specified restrictions. 60 If a donor contributed $20 million, for
example, "to construct an inpatient care facility in Hometown for treatment
of Affliction X, with no less than twenty patient beds and to be named the
'John Doe Center,"' decisions governed by the corporate standard of care
would include, among other things, where (within Hometown) to locate the
facility, whether to build a facility with more than twenty patient beds, and
whether those beds should be housed in private, semiprivate, or common
rooms.
If changed circumstances later suggest that inpatient care lacks
meaningful benefit to those suffering from Affliction X, or alternatively,
that a freestanding facility in Hometown is no longer economically feasible,
the charity fiduciaries' conduct in redeploying the gifted assets would be
governed by the stricter standards found in trust law. Those fiduciaries
would, in other words, lack the autonomy typically associated with
"corporate" governance to identify other, more currently relevant purposes
or means of operation, and then to make a unilateral decision about how
best to redeploy the assets in light of those opportunities. 61 Absent
provisions in the gift instrument or a donor release under the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA), those fiduciaries would
instead be compelled to seek judicial approval for modification or release of
the restrictions under the trust doctrines of cy pres or equitable deviation.62
60. The comments confirm the typically greater board autonomy associated with the
corporate form, but again suggest by parenthetical that a more strict approach is likely when
it comes to deviating from the terms of a restricted gift: "The corporate board ... has greater
autonomy in adjusting to unanticipated circumstances (with protection for restricted gifts)."
Id.; see also id. § 240(b) & cmt. a ("Because the degree of flexibility in altering charitable
purpose is one of the choices the founders and donors make in selecting the charity's
organizational form, [§ 240] confines the obligation to seek judicial relief to the trustees of
charitable trusts with respect to all restrictions, and to the boards of directors of nonprofit
corporations only with respect to restricted charitable gifts (and not to all assets of the
corporation), as provided in § 250."). Comment a to section 250 further explains that "[flor
a charitable corporation, subsection (b) provides that the charity must ensure that restricted
gifts (as defined in section 405) are applied to their original purposes. If that cannot be done,
then the charity must obtain approval to release or modify the restriction as set forth in §
430." Id. § 250 cmt. a. Under section 430(b), a gift restriction can be modified or released
only as provided in the gift instrument, by donor release as provided under the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA or, as revised in 2006, Uniform Prudent
Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA)), or pursuant to a court order in a cy pres
or equitable deviation action. UMIFA governs endowment funds and is currently in effect in
forty-seven states. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 335 cmt. b(2) & reporter's
notes (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (discussing in detail UMIFA and UPMIFA provisions
for modifying donor restrictions).
61. As to autonomy to alter purposes under a corporate standard of care in the case of
unrestricted gifts, see, for example, id. § 240(b) & cmt. b.
62. Management would be "compelled" both because the board lacks autonomy to make
such changes on its own accord, and because a charity's governing board has a duty to keep
the gifted funds productive for the benefit of the charitable class. See id. § 430(b) & cmt. a;
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Charitable fiduciaries sometimes find themselves in a fuzzy middle
ground when it comes to determining whether certain applications of gifted
assets are within the parameters of a donor's restrictions (and thus within
the purview of managerial discretion), or whether judicial authorization for
such applications might be required. 63  In the foregoing hypothetical
situation, for example, if the charitable fiduciaries decided to build a thirty-
bed "John Doe Center" for treating patients with discrete Afflictions X or
Y, and: staffed the facility with specialists trained only in treating one or the
other affliction-perhaps because of some recognized synergies between
the two specialties-it is less clear that this is a managerial prerogative
subject to evaluation under a corporate standard of care, or a departure from
donor restrictions to be addressed under trust law concepts. While at first
blush these decisions seem to be the types to be made by management in its
discretion, if there is no clear reservation of twenty beds or specific care for
patients suffering from the donor's chosen Affliction X, a departure from
the donor's purposes is arguably at issue.64
B. The Detail in the Duties
Against this background, consider first the fiduciary duty of care. The
duty of care relates to the competence displayed by management in carrying
out its managerial responsibilities. Commentators variously describe the
duty as requiring that management be diligent and attentive, that decisions
be informed, and that actions be carried out in good faith and with
"ordinary prudence." 65 In the context of a restricted gift, for example, the
Fremont-Smith, supra note 57, at 225-26, 440; see also Principles of the Law of Nonprofit
Orgs. § 240 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007); id. § 240 cmt. b ("[A]ltering the
activities of a charitable trust requires recourse to [a] court ... in situations that, in the
absence of a restricted gift, can be addressed by a corporate board." (emphasis added));
supra notes 57, 60.
63. See, e.g., Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 240 cmt. b, illus. 4
(Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007) ("[The ALI draft concludes that a] court should approve the
change even though the restriction is not impossible to honor, because the board has
determined in good faith that the restriction is administrative rather than the donor's
charitable purpose. Applying cy pres instead of deviation could mean the difference
between deferring to a reasonable determination by the charity fiduciaries and adhering to
the wishes of [the donor] unless it becomes impossible or impracticable (or wasteful) to do
so .... "); id. § 430 cmt. a ("[I]f the restriction cannot be complied with ... application of
this Section is mandatory .... However, the charity may exercise reasonable judgment in
determining when to seek relief."). Section 430(b) provides that a gift restriction may be
modified (or released) pursuant to provisions set forth in the gift instrument, pursuant to
UMIFA or a similar state statute, or pursuant to a court order. Id. § 430(b); see also id. §
440(c) ("The availability of modification, the choice of remedy, and the degree of deference
to the charity in framing the revised restriction depend on the circumstances."); cf Principles
of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 250 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007).
64. Consider whether the American Law Institute (ALl) Principles provide an answer
here: "A charity complies with a gift restriction ... if the charity, acting in good faith,
reasonably implements all material requirements of the terms of the restriction ... and seeks
relief under § 430... when appropriate." Id. § 420(a).
65. For various standards of conduct articulated in state statutes, and for a discussion of
the business judgment rule in the context of nonprofit organizations, see Principles of the
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duty of care suggests that some procedure should be established for
ensuring and monitoring compliance with the terms of a recipient
organization's basket of restricted gifts.66 More specifically, were a lack of
internal controls to result in an inadvertent misuse of restricted gift funds,
the organization's management might fairly be regarded as having failed to
meet its duty of care by virtue of the failure of process and lack of attention
to this concern.
The duty of loyalty, by contrast, is most easily described as a prohibition
against self-dealing. In the context of a nonprofit organization, loyalty
requires faithful pursuit of the interests of the organization, as opposed to
the self-interest of the decision maker or other interests external to the
organization. 67 Were an organization to accept property limited to uses
tangential to its mission and difficult or costly to maintain, further burdened
with terms that permit the donor's continued use or exploitation of the
property in some manner, this would implicate a breach of the managerial
duty of loyalty. The likelihood of such a breach would be heightened if the
donor also held a fiduciary management position that allowed her to
influence the organization's acceptance of the gift terms.
Equally important in the restricted gift context is the duty of obedience,
or at least the managerial obligations suggested by the separate articulation
of such a duty.68  This latter caveat is necessary, because some
commentators identify the duty of obedience separately, while others reject
Law of Nonprofit Organizations § 300 reporter's note 6 (Discussion Draft 2006). See
generally Fremont-Smith, supra note 57, at 199-215; Daniel L. Kurtz, Board Liability:
Guide for Nonprofit Directors 49-59 (1988); Brody, supra note 57, at 657-60.
66. See, e.g., Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 420 cmt. b(1) (Preliminary
Draft No. 4, 2007) ("[T]his Section does not dictate particular procedures for conducting and
documenting the required monitoring [of compliance with the terms of a restricted gift].
Needless to say, a charity with more complete records will find it easier to defend a charge
that it breached a restriction or condition, but the absence of records does not of itself
constitute a breach.").
67. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 (2003); Principles of the Law of Nonprofit
Organizations § 310 reporter's notes 10-12 (Discussion Draft 2006) (discussing various
articulations of the duty of loyalty). The duty is described in relation to a restricted gift in
comment a(1) of section 310:
[T]he charity's board members must interpret [the organization's] purpose in the
exercise of their discretion, subject to any restriction imposed by the settlor or
donors. By using the phrase 'best interests of the charity, in light of its stated
purposes,' this Section combines the trust and corporate language to declare an
affirmative obligation of the fiduciaries to govern for charitable purposes, and not
for the benefit of board members, executives, donors, or other private parties.
Id. § 310 cmt. a(1).
68. The origins of this duty can be traced to the work of Daniel L. Kurtz, supra note 65.
Fremont-Smith, supra note 57, at 225. See generally Rob Atkinson, The Low Road to Cy
Pres Reform: Principled Practice to Remove Dead Hand Control of Charitable Assets (Fla.
State Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 176, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract-id=845927. This duty is often discussed in
the context of the restraints upon nonprofit corporation management in changing the
corporation's purposes as originally expressed in the organization's charter and other
governing documents.
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the reach of such a freestanding duty and instead regard the suggested
obligations as subsumed under the duties of loyalty and care.69 By thus
rejecting the unilateral reach of a freestanding duty of obedience,
commentators in this latter camp emphasize management's duty to keep the
overall purposes of a charity current so as to serve the needs of present and
future charitable beneficiaries-thus keeping obedience to the dead hand in
perspective. 70 Whether identified separately or characterized as part of the
duties of care and loyalty, the clearly recognized obligations suggested here
charge an organization's management "with carrying out the [donor's]
purposes." 71
Under whatever fiduciary guise, the concepts underlying the unsettled
existence of this duty should be easily understood by those responsible for
managing a donor's restricted gifts. Without negating the duty to overall
organizational mission, fiduciary responsibility or "obedience" in this
restricted gift context has roots in the long-accepted trust law principle that
a trustee must administer a trust in a manner faithful to the wishes of the
creator.72 Should changing circumstances thwart that donor purpose or
should those purposes over time come to threaten the accomplishment of
the charity's overall mission, these trust law principles require that
management pursue judicial modification of the donor's terms. 73 Such
authorized modification would be in lieu of, for example, management's
simply implementing the desired changes under its general powers to
manage the affairs of the organization, or otherwise simply continuing to
69. See, e.g., Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 240 cmt. c (Preliminary Draft
No. 4, 2007) (rejecting a separate duty of obedience, "at least as it has been interpreted to
prevent a board.., of a nonprofit corporation from altering corporate purposes
prospectively"); Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 47, at 219 (describing duty as "somewhat
less recognized"); Katz, supra note 2, at 699-701 (noting variations in articulation of what
duty requires). Under "the most robust version of the duty," the board must adhere to the
corporation's original purposes absent circumstances akin to those required to initiate a cy
pres action. Katz, supra note 2, at 700; see also Kurtz, supra note 65, at 85.
Marion Fremont-Smith and other commentators reject the existence of such a duty,
instead suggesting that managerial obligations in the face of such changes are governed by
the universally accepted duties of care and loyalty. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 57, at
225-26; see also Evelyn Brody, Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 Md. L. Rev. 1400,
1406 n.30 (1998). See generally Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. §§ 210 cmt. b(3),
240 cmts. a, c & reporter's notes 6-8 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007); Principles of the Law
of Nonprofit Organizations § 320 cmt. e (Discussion Draft 2006); Fishman & Schwarz,
supra note 47, at 219-23.
70. See, e.g., Fremont-Smith, supra note 57, at 225-26, 439.
71. Kurtz, supra note 65, at 85. The added language perhaps bastardizes, but no doubt
renders less debatable, Professor Daniel L. Kurtz's articulation of the duty by reference to
organizational purposes. See also Katz, supra note 2, at 700 (noting positive and negative
aspects of duty).
72. Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 47, at 219 (citing Scott & Fratcher, supra note 19, §
164.1); see also supra notes 57-60; supra Part IV.A.
73. In Kurtz's view, this duty would regard the organization's corporate purposes, as set
forth in the organizational charter, as constituting express terms upon which all gifts to the
corporation are conditioned. Kurtz, supra note 65, at 85.
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pursue a futile objective or employing ineffective means. 74 In any event,
regardless of organizational form or the specific name given the duty, an
organization's management must certainly strive to be faithful to the
restrictions that a donor imposes upon her gift.
V. INATTENTIVENESS TO DUTY
Although each of the noted fiduciary duties offers fertile grounds for
exploration, the examination here will now focus upon why these duties
should play prominently in the minds of a recipient organization's
managers-apart from the general idea that any breach of a formally
recognized duty is inherently a bad thing that could result in some particular
brand of liability. 75 In other words, putting aside the possible invocation of
formal legal remedies like fund restitution, injunction, or trustee removal, I
would like to explore some of the more subtle ramifications of a recipient
organization's (in)attentiveness to these duties in the context of managing
restricted gifts. The current dispute between Princeton University and the
Robertson family provides a path that will help guide this exploration. 76
A. Robertson v. Princeton
Commentators describe the very public dispute between Princeton
University and the Robertson family as one "that could significantly
influence the future of restricted charitable giving in the U.S."'77 The
dispute centers upon Princeton's handling of a $35 million gift to the
university made by Marie and Charles Robertson in 1961.78 That gift has
74. With regard to the duties of care and loyalty and the actions those duties require
when donor terms become outdated or otherwise problematic, see supra notes 62, 67 and
accompanying text.
75. Many commentators regard the formal legal enforcement of these fiduciary duties as
lax anyway. See, e.g., Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 47, at 248 (noting that "attorney
general oversight [is] more theoretical than deterrent"); id. at 169 ("The duty of care ... is
quite low, and ... liability [is] improbable except in the most egregious cases .... "); id. at
151 (noting that breach of care matters are typically settled quickly with state attorneys
general, while the notoriety arising from reports of such breaches "can be devastating");
Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations ch. 3, introductory note, at 5 (Discussion
Draft 2006) ("[T]he law generally declines to impose monetary penalties for breaches of the
duty of care, and focuses instead on nonmonetary equitable remedies, such as injunctions
and removal of directors or trustees (and other reputational sanctions)." (emphasis added));
see also infra note 121.
76. See supra note 7 for an explanation of the scope of this discussion.
77. Dick Dahl, Princeton Case Puts Spotlight on Charitable Gifts with 'Strings
Attached,' Lawyers USA, Jan. 1, 2007, at 3; see also John Hechinger & Daniel Golden,
Poisoned Ivy, Fight at Princeton Escalates over Use of a Family's Gift, Wall St. J., Feb. 7,
2006, at Al.
78. I take the liberty here of designating the gift as one made jointly by the Robertsons.
All indications suggest that the gift was the product of the joint act and decision of Marie
and Charles, and media reports typically refer to "the Robertsons" as donors. The Robertson
descendants likewise refer to the gift as if it were their parents' joint act of philanthropy. See,
e.g., Geoff Mulvihill, Princeton Donors Want Their Millions Back, CBS News, Nov. 28,
2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/28/national/main2211409.shtml ("Relatives
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since grown to comprise a fund worth over $800 million, which represents
six percent of Princeton's total endowment.79 Although both Marie and
Charles are now deceased, several surviving Robertson family members
have filed suit against Princeton over Princeton's alleged disregard for the
restrictions imposed by Marie and Charles at the time of their 1961 gift.80
As to restrictions, the Robertsons directed that their gift be used to
educate graduate students at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs. More specifically, the documents governing the
gift provide that
[the] objective is to strengthen the Government of the United States and
increase its ability and determination to defend and extend freedom
throughout the world by improving the facilities for the training and
education of men and women for government service and to contribute
[funds]... to or for the use of Princeton University for any one or more
or all of the following uses:
(a) To establish or maintain and support. .. a Graduate School, where
men and women dedicated to public service may prepare themselves for
careers in government service, with particular emphasis on the education
of such persons for careers in those areas of the Federal Government that
are concerned with international relations and affairs .... 81
of Charles S. and Marie Robertson said the couple wanted their gift to be spent .... ). A&P
heiress Marie Robertson is actually the donor. Her husband, Charles Robertson, graduated
from Princeton in 1926, and this appears to be the primary affiliation that inspired the gift.
All indications are that Charles played a very active role in negotiating the terms and
structure of the gift. Marie, Charles, and a representative of Princeton, for example, signed
the composite certificate of incorporation of the Robertson Foundation, the primary
document setting forth the gift terms. Charles also played a prominent role in the
management of this foundation, which was established solely to administer the gift. The
composite certificate of incorporation can be found in its entirety at the Robertson v.
Princeton web site. Composite Certificate of Incorporation of the Robertson Foundation
(1961), available at http ://www.robertsonvprinceton.org/legaldocuments/incorporation.pdf.
As to the significance of the gift, it was regarded as "almost inconceivably generous."
Dahl, supra note 77. The gift is said to have "[a]t the time... [been] one of the largest ever
in support of higher education and the largest in Princeton's history." Robertson v.
Princeton, http://www.robertsonvprinceton.org/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
79. See John Hechinger, Princeton Reimburses Donors' Foundation, Wall St. J., Mar.
13, 2007, at A2 (placing gift value at $800 million and noting the six percent figure). A May
2007 article places the value at $840 million. Former Gov. Tom Kean to Succeed Jay
Sherrerd on Robertson Board, News@Princeton, May 1, 2007,
http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S 17/79/79M88/index.xml?section=announcem
ents. Princeton emphasizes the growth of the fund as evidence of good stewardship.
80. Marie Robertson died in 1973, and Charles died in 1981. The plaintiffs in the
current litigation are three Robertson children and one other relative. See Robertson v.
Princeton, supra note 78. The Robertson family members serving as plaintiffs in the current
litigation are hereinafter referred to as the "Robertson family."
81. Composite Certificate of Incorporation of the Robertson Foundation, supra note 78;
see also text accompanying note 84. I have taken the liberty in the above quote of changing
"its" to "[The]" at the beginning of the quoted language. The composite certificate is the
most direct expression of "donor intent," as that concept is discussed in this essay. Whether
viewed as equivalent to an instrument of gift or a representation of a negotiated agreement
regarding the use and administration of the gift, the composite certificate certainly expresses
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The Robertsons made their gift to Princeton via the establishment of
"The Robertson Foundation." 82 The Robertson Foundation is a nonprofit,
charitable corporation that operates as an I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) supporting
organization, with Princeton being the supported charity. 83 The foundation
is governed by a seven-member board, as to which Princeton appoints four
of the members and the Robertson family the remaining three. 84 Prior to
his death, Charles Robertson was active in the foundation's management,
the Robertsons' understanding and desires with regard to such matters. See, e.g., Principles
of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 420 cmt. b(2) & reporter's note 8 (Preliminary Draft No. 4,
2007) (discussing gift acceptance policies in the context of donor negotiations and noting
that "[a] major restricted gift might result only after detailed negotiation .... ").
82. See Composite Certificate of Incorporation of the Robertson Foundation, supra note
78.
83. The Robertson Foundation was formed in 1961, prior to the enactment of the 1969
Tax Reform Act which added § 509(a)(3) and the supporting organization concept to the Tax
Code. Prior to such enactment, the foundation possessed characteristics of what is today
technically known as a "Type I" § 509(a)(3) organization. The foundation in fact elected
such status shortly after doing so became possible by virtue of the 1969 legislation. See
Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on "Fiduciary Duties" and "Business Judgment," Robertson v. Princeton Univ.,
No. C-99-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. July 11, 2006) [hereinafter Def. Mem.], available at
http://www.robertsonvprinceton.org/legal.php; Memorandum to author, supra note 7, at 4.
For a recent discussion of I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) supporting organizations, see Neil T.
Kawashima & Mary Lee Turk, The Demise of the Type III Supporting Organization, 32
Actec J. 289 (2007); see also Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 415 reporter's note
8(c) (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007).
84. The ramifications of the Robertson Foundation being structured as an organization
created expressly to support Princeton, and over which Princeton was by agreement given
majority control, is a significant point of legal contention in the current litigation. On the
one hand, decisions made regarding the Robertson gift funds are made by the Robertson
Foundation board of directors, not by Princeton University directly. On the other hand and
according to the Robertson plaintiffs, the Princeton appointees to the foundation board have
typically been closely aligned with and subservient to Princeton's requests and objectives,
such that Princeton bears ultimate responsibility for any wrongful departure from the
Robertson gift terms. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment re Fiduciary Duties and Business Judgment Rule at 6-21, Robertson v.
Princeton Univ., No. C-99-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. (n.d.)) [hereinafter P1. Reply Mem.],
available at http://www.robertsonvprinceton.org/legal.php.
While allegations of malfeasance could be directed solely at the Robertson Foundation
board members who authorized a particular expenditure, for purposes of this essay the
discussion is framed consistent with the litigation posture-i.e., both the majority/Princeton-
controlled foundation board members and Princeton University itself (by virtue of its
control) are responsible for any potential wrongdoing. In this regard, media reports typically
refer to the matter as a dispute between the Robertson plaintiffs and Princeton University.
See supra text accompanying notes 77-80. In any event, fiduciary duties clearly reside
somewhere in this case, and thus the dispute clearly presents a good vehicle for exploring
those duties notwithstanding the parties' contentions as to exactly where those duties lie.
Indeed, the fact that Princeton is both given control and identified as the supported
organization should not obviate the duty discussed in Part IV to adhere to donor restrictions.
The difficulty in separating Princeton from any notion of wrongdoing where funds are
utilized outside the Robertson gift parameters can be seen, for example, in the potential
misappropriation discussed in infra note 88 and accompanying text and Part V.C. In that
case, after being alerted to a potential misappropriation of foundation funds by a former
university general counsel and then foundation secretary/treasurer, "someone" decided that
the potential misappropriation should not be disclosed to the full foundation board.
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serving as its president from 1961 until his death in 1981.85 While serving
in that role, Charles Robertson allegedly clashed with Princeton over the
utilization of the gift, based upon his belief that too few students of the
program actually pursued government service. 86
Apart from this conflict over the university's diligent pursuit of the
suggested mission, there have been other, more recent disagreements
between the university and the three Robertson family trustees. 87 The
trigger that spurred the current litigation appears to have been a 2002
decision to manage the Robertson gift funds as part of the university's
general endowment. 88 The original gift agreement stated that the funds
were not to be commingled with the university's endowment, although
Princeton asserts that the funds are now appropriately held in a separate
account as part of that endowment. 89
In any event, Princeton appointees made this decision in the face of
express objections by the three Robertson family trustees, thus (by one
view) "antagonizing" several surviving Robertson family members to the
point of initiating the formal legal action.90 Princeton and/or its appointees
may have foreseen the emergence of these plaintiffs and thus weighed that
negative consequence in relation to the benefits to be gained by
85. Former Gov. Tom Kean to Succeed Jay Sherrerd on Robertson Board, supra note
79.
86. See P1. Reply Mem., supra note 84, at 53-58; Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77;
see also Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 13-17 (discussing why students have not gone into
government service). Hechinger and Golden assert that "[a]lmost from the start, Charles...
clashed with Princeton officials because he thought too many students from the graduate
program were ending up outside government." Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77.
Princeton, on the other hand, asserts that it is more than a trade school for "low level
government bureaucrats," and that in any event it has little control over student job choices
upon graduation. Memorandum to author, supra note 7, at 3-4, 8-10.
87. See supra notes 82-84 (regarding the disputes over the seven-member board and
legal structure underlying the gift).
88. Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77. Technically, the decision was made by the
foundation board of directors, and not Princeton University. Memorandum to author, supra
note 7, at 4. That decision was made by a vote of 4-3, with the four votes coming from
Princeton appointees (with continuing university affiliations) and the three dissenters being
members appointed by the Robertson family. This accounts for the plaintiffs' attribution of
this decision to Princeton itself. See supra note 84.
89. The foundation's certificate of incorporation allows the foundation's assets to be
managed as part of the university's general endowment upon dissolution of the foundation,
though the gift restrictions are nevertheless to continue to apply and the funds are still to be
held "as a separate and distinct endowment fund." Composite Certificate of Incorporation of
the Robertson Foundation, supra note 78, at art. 13. This specific authorization following
dissolution could easily be read to preclude such a merger with the university's general
endowment (even via a separate fund) prior to dissolution of the foundation.
90. The pejorative term "antagonizing" appears in the previously noted 2006 Wall Street
Journal article. Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77. The term "antagonizing" is repeated
here simply to indicate the level of conflict over this issue prior to the decision to align the
management of the Robertson Foundation funds more closely with Princeton's general
endowment fund administration.
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consolidating management of the funds. 91 Going forward in the face of
such threatened legal action, moreover, is not in and of itself a breach of
any duty, and could indeed be quite the opposite where the decision to
proceed is believed-after reasonable investigation and deliberation-to be
in the best interests of the organization. 92 Nevertheless, one lesson that can
easily be gleaned from the present state of affairs is that there is more to
restricted gift management than formal compliance with the legal fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty. 93
More specifically, even if Princeton establishes that the investment
structure represents an appropriate exercise of managerial discretion, the
victory is a bittersweet one, at best. Regardless of whether the plaintiffs
ultimately establish their base claim that the "investment management"
decision was improper, litigation has invited intensive scrutiny of
Princeton's managerial actions. The discovery phase of this litigation has
thus far produced revelations of other potential missteps by Princeton in its
oversight and use of both the Robertson and other restricted gifts. 94 The
Robertson family brought in an outside auditor as part of its own litigation
discovery, and that auditor's efforts now underlie their public allegation that
Princeton has "used the [gift's] growing endowment as a University 'piggy
bank,' diverting more than $200 million to activities, projects, programs,
and personnel unrelated to the [foundation's stated] mission. '95
With regard to these allegations, much more is now at stake than a
judicial declaration of some fiduciary failing coupled with an injunction to
undo the alleged commingling, or perhaps an order to restore any
misappropriated funds. If victorious in their litigation, the Robertson
family seeks to separate Princeton from control of the funds, with a further
91. As to this being Princeton's decision versus one merely endorsed by or influenced
by Princeton, see supra note 88. In this case, standing to sue Princeton is not a major issue
because two of the plaintiffs are members of the foundation's governing board, and as such
have standing to sue in the event of a perceived breach of duty by the other
directors/trustees. In a more typical direct gift scenario, the attorney general may be the only
outside party having standing to sue, although there is some trend towards liberalizing
standing for donors and other interested parties. See, e.g., Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt
Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div. 2001).
92. Those interests are defined to some extent, of course, by the purposes stated in the
gift terms.
93. With regard to the "duty of obedience," see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying
text.
94. See Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77. Among the potential problem gifts cited by
The Wall Street Journal is one made by the family of former Senator John Danforth. The
Danforth family made the gift with the intent that it support "religious work" on campus.
According to a former analyst in Princeton's development office, in 2002 only $6000 of the
then $18.5 million Danforth fund was allocated to the university's office of religious life,
and although over $700,000 was "supposed to go for scholarships in the religion department,
the school 'reallocated the money to general funds."' Id. Also, according to The Wall Street
Journal, "millions of [Robertson Foundation] dollars flowed to such programs as the Wilson
School's Center for Research on Child Wellbeing." Id.
95. Robertson v. Princeton, supra note 78. The auditor's report is not without contest
and controversy, as clearly revealed by the parties' briefs. See, e.g., Def. Mem., supra note
83, at 33-35.
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authorization to employ the restricted assets in pursuit of the donors'
purposes-but via colleges and universities other than Princeton. 96 By the
time this litigation concludes, a Robertson family victory could easily cost
the university over $1 billion. 97  Even absent that potential loss to
Princeton, the costs of this dispute in both dollar and reputational terms are
already notable. As to dollar costs, the parties have collectively spent over
$30 million in pursuing and defending their respective positions since
litigation was initiated in 2002.98
B. Reputation and Publicity
As to reputation, the case is being closely watched by professionals,
educational institutions, and the public in general, with the press
characterizing the dispute as "the most important case higher education has
faced over the question of honoring the wishes of a donor." 99
Commentators have long suggested that the prospect of negative
publicity is a significant deterrent of wrongful nonprofit management
behavior.' 00 Some have even suggested that this deterrent may be an even
more potent "stick" than the prospect of formal legal sanctions for breach of
fiduciary duties, the enforcement of which is often regarded as lax in the
nonprofit charitable sector.101
In this regard, the Robertson family has used the threat (indeed, the
reality) of negative publicity as a sword against Princeton with much
deliberateness, if not effectiveness. The Robertson family, for example,
maintains a web site chronicling the dispute from the family's
perspective.10 2 The Robertson family has also strategically placed editorial
commentary in major newspapers, and even provided litigation documents
to The Wall Street Journal as background for a February 7, 2006, expos6 on
96. The Robertsons' suit "seeks to let the Robertsons use the gift money independently
of Princeton ...." Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77. This may prove difficult for
plaintiffs in light of Princeton's clear identification as the foundation's supported
organization. See supra note 84. On the other hand, the Robertson family asserts that
Princeton's failure to abide by the terms of the gift constitutes a serious breach of fiduciary
duty that justifies removal of the funds from Princeton's control, as well as application of
those funds to support universities that have been (according to the Robertson family) much
more successful at achieving the objectives identified by Charles and Marie Robertson.
97. Plaintiff William Robertson proposed this figure in a newspaper account, but given
that the Robertson gift grew from $650 million to $800 million between 2006 and 2007, this
figure seems reasonable.
98. Michael Juel-Larsen, In Court, Barbs Traded over Wilson School,
DailyPrincetonian.com, Nov. 29, 2006,
http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/2006/11/29/news/16766.shtml (noting that the
dispute has cost each side more than $15 million).
99. Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77.
100. See Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1125; see also Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 47,
at 242-68.
101. See supra note 75; infra note 121.
102. See Robertson v. Princeton, supra note 78; see also Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 55
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the dispute. 10 3 That article was less than flattering with regard to the
university's handling of the entire Robertson matter. 104 The very fact of
Princeton's public acknowledgement of, and response to, that article
immediately upon its publication-on its own litigation-specific web site,
no less-evidences that Princeton is very aware of the public relations
dimension of this dispute. 105
C. An Admitted (?) Mistake
The litigation has also revealed internal Princeton correspondence that
arguably exposes other problematic university attitudes, if not conduct. In
2002, for example, the university's former general counsel (and then-
serving university officer and Robertson Foundation secretary/treasurer)
informed the university president (who was also then serving as foundation
chair) via e-mail that a document, not yet disclosed, would reveal the
university's use of $750,000 from the Robertson fund to pay the tuition of
students whose studies were arguably not in line with the purposes
underlying the Robertson gift. 10 6 That correspondence further advised that
the Robertson family would be "greatly upset" to learn of this. 10 7 Under
any version of the disputed facts, someone in this correspondence loop
made the decision not to disclose this information to the Robertson-
appointed foundation board members charged with overseeing the
Robertson gift.10 8  The Robertson plaintiffs, not surprisingly, allege a
cover-up. Although denying any intentional cover-up, "Princeton now
acknowledges that it revised the document so the outlays weren't disclosed
to the [Robertsons' appointed board members]."' 1 9  The university
concedes impropriety, however, only with regard to nondisclosure and not
with respect to the merits of the expenditure itself. 1 0 Allegedly on that sole
basis, the university paid the Robertson Foundation $782,375 in early 2007
as reimbursement for the expenditures."'
103. Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77.
104. As stated in that article, the lawsuit has "rais[ed] broader questions about Princeton's
fidelity to its donors' intentions in this and other cases." Id.; see, e.g., supra note 94.
105. See Princeton Univ., Robertson Lawsuit,
http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/robertson/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
106. See Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 40, 49-50; Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77.
The students were Ph.D. candidates in the departments of economics, politics, and sociology.
Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 48-49. Princeton disputes the conclusions reached by its
former general counsel as set forth in the noted e-mail, calling the correspondence
"unfortunate." Id. at 50.
107. Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 50; Hechinger, supra note 79; Hechinger & Golden,
supra note 77.
108. There is no dispute over the existence or contents of the e-mail, or its nondisclosure.
Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 50.
109. Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77. For a more nuanced but generally consistent
characterization of the nondisclosure, see Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 50 (disputing the
allegation of a cover-up).
110. Hechinger, supra note 79.
111. Id.
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As to the formal legal duties governing the conduct of fiduciaries (like
the university president and the university official then serving as
foundation secretary/treasurer), if true, this episode represents a likely
breach of the duty of care in allowing the diversion to occur through
inattentiveness in the first instance. That such care should have been
deliberately employed through, for example, the adoption of
oversight/monitoring procedures is bolstered by the concepts embodied in
the trust law standards, attendant restricted gift oversight, and the
affirmative compliance those standards require.' 12
The managerial shortcoming here is further compounded by the failure to
disclose the breach upon discovery, which could easily be characterized as a
self-interested action potentially rising to the level of a breach of the duty of
loyalty. 113 Loyalty comes into play because "covering up" the failing may
have been motivated by a desire to avoid negative repercussions for the
managers in charge, as opposed to concern for the best interests of the
organization. In this regard, note that the information was known to
university official(s) and the university's foundation board appointee(s), but
deliberately concealed from the Robertson appointees. It is those Robertson
appointees who, in defense of what they perceive to be the Robertsons' gift
intentions, would be the most likely to question the expenditures. 114
Deliberate concealment of such information, moreover, constitutes a direct
affront to the notion of transparency that borders on fraud. 115  As to
transparency, one should keep in mind that an overriding issue here is
accountability for compliance with donor intentions, as embodied in the
terms of a restricted gift. 116
112. In fact, the university has since "created an electronic database to monitor
compliance with gift restrictions." Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77; see also supra note
66 (discussing monitoring procedures). Absent any bad faith, the noted potential breach of
the duty of care would likely only require a restoration of the misspent funds and perhaps an
apology-regrettable, but certainly not too significant for one of the richest academic
institutions in the country. See supra note 75 and infra note 121 regarding the lax penalties
that often accompany such breaches.
113. See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 65, at 26 (placing such a failing within the context of a
breach of the duty of care by noting "the failure to deal with a shortcoming noted in an
auditor's ... review letter could ... sustain[] a finding of inattention and, hence, a violation
of the duty of care ....").
114. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
115. In this regard, the Robertson family has included a claim for punitive damages based
in part on this alleged fraud. P1. Reply Mem., supra note 84, at 19-21. In its defense,
Princeton disputes the accuracy of Thomas Wright's conclusions as stated in the 2002 e-
mail, and further notes that President Shirley Tilghman had only recently taken office, was
not familiar with the foundation's operations or the basis for the expenditures in question,
and that in any event "she did not know who made the [nondisclosure] decision or how the
decision was made." Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 50.
116. See, e.g., Jeff Muskus & Raymond Pacia, Univ. Gifts Raise Issue of Control:
Dispute over Future of LKI Reflects Complications That Surround Univ. Donations, Yale
Daily News, Nov. 18, 2004, http://www.yaledailynews.com/articles/view/12366 ("'[D]onors
have becomes [sic] a group certainly much more interested in how their gifts are going to be
used.... It sort of reflects the tenor of the times in the sense that there are calls for
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Whether representative of intentional dishonesty or a mere lack of
oversight, this and similar alleged failings (and the publicity relating
thereto) have ramifications that extend beyond the bounds of mere issues of
compliance with the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. In particular,
Princeton's problems provide further insight on the broader topic at hand
when considered in light of the university's twofold response to the
Robertsons' assertions that donor intent has been neglected. Princeton first
posits a more liberal interpretation of the gift terms, opining that the
seemingly specific government service goals set forth in the Robertson gift
documents are merely indicative of a broader public service mission."17
Princeton further suggests that it is not possible to implement any more
limited interpretation of the Robertsons' gift restrictions. In this regard,
Princeton's chief legal counsel asserts that "[t]he nature of governmental
service and the best way to prepare for it have changed over time." 118
Though this latter statement is likely true, in the context of a dispute over
the scope of donor intent, such language is more characteristic of that
employed when a gift "reincarnation" is on the table, under legal principles
that are the subject of the following Part VI.
VI. THE CRITICAL STAGE: WHERE DEATH AND
REINCARNATION LOOM LARGE
Understand first that Princeton has not requested any formal legal
modification of the terms of the Robertson gift. More specifically,
Princeton has not sought a judicial declaration that the terms of the gift have
become so limiting over time that it is now appropriate to broaden those
restrictions under the traditional judicial doctrines of cy pres or equitable
deviation. 19  Thus far, Princeton's defense instead focuses upon the
university's own interpretation of exactly what educational pursuits the
Robertsons intended their restricted gift to support-in other words,
Princeton claims that its actions have at all times been consistent with the
accountability in all parts of our society."' (quoting an alumni relations official in the context
of the Robertson v. Princeton dispute)).
117. See Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77; see also infra Part VI. With respect to
compliance with the terms of the Robertson gift, Princeton asserts that it has always been in
compliance with those gift terms, and that the real issue is not one of discerning intent as
much as it is the Robertson family now trying to tell Princeton how it should go about
fulfilling that mission. Memorandum to author, supra note 7, at 2, 10. There appears to be
little question, however, as to the existence of a more general disagreement over the scope of
activities and breadth of mission that the Robertsons intended to support.
118. Dahl, supra note 77. Princeton further asserts that the real dispute is over whether
the university should be required "to build a trade school which graduates entry-level
bureaucrats ... or ... an esteemed graduate school at which men and women may prepare to
be leaders in public service careers." Memorandum to author, supra note 7, at 10. It may be
that the real question is where (if at all) to draw the line between that broader Wilson School
mission and the (allegedly) more limited objectives sought to be supported by the
Robertsons via their gift.
119. For a more detailed discussion of cy pres and equitable deviation, see infra Part
VI.B.
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Robertson's original intent. 120 It is in this context that the boundaries of
managerial prerogative become more difficult to articulate with precision. I
will therefore consider Princeton's interpretive focus first. I will then
examine the potential relevance to this dispute of cy pres and equitable
deviation. In this context, the parties' various actions and arguments are
particularly informative when viewed against the broader backdrop of an
evolution from an initiating donor-charity agreement, to how the recipient
organization thereafter manages the property, to what the recipient would
like to do with the property now.
A. The Interpretive Approach
The absence of any request for judicially sanctioned modification of the
Robertson gift terms suggests an important route open to a recipient
organization that views the literal terms of a restricted gift document as
problematic. Specifically, if a recipient organization finds it difficult (or
undesirable) to comply with a strict, or perhaps more obvious, construction
of a donor's terms, and if that organization is reluctant to pursue judicial
modification of those restrictions, then the organization might simply
unilaterally (re)interpret the gift terms or otherwise disregard them. 121 This
is not to suggest that such action would be proper, or in many instances,
even defensible. The unpredictability (and resulting mandate) of a cy pres
or equitable deviation action and generally lax attorney general
enforcement, however, might lead charitable management in this
direction. 122
On the other hand, there is also support for the idea that management has
some leeway when dealing with the terms of a restricted gift. Consider, for
example, the most recent draft of the ALI Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Organizations, wherein the Reporter notes that "[t]he governing
board will often have to exercise some level of discretion in implementing
120. Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 74 (arguing that cy pres is in fact not available in this
case, because the Robertson Foundation is a corporation, not a trust). But see supra notes
56-60 and accompanying text.
121. Professor Rob Atkinson believes that well-intentioned management may be led in
this direction by the prospects of lax attorney general enforcement of the noted fiduciary
duties. This route might also be accompanied by some negotiation to appease the donor's
descendants. The possibility of subsequent judicial ratification of the organization's
departure from the donor's instructions could further underlie the organization's decision to
proceed in this manner. Professor Atkinson cautions, however, that absent some confidence
in the attorney general's or court's likely view of such action, "[T]he zone of comfort [here]
is not only ill-defined, but also small." Atkinson, supra note 68, at 35, 42-44.
Less principled organizational management might ignore all of these perils and simply
disregard donor instructions because management seeks to advance their own alternate
agenda (without regard to any true need for gift modification). Perhaps even less
flatteringly, management might seek to "indulge their private vanities or inflate their egos"
by acting as they see fit, without regard to limitations imposed by others. Id. at 45.
122. See supra notes 75 and 121 regarding lax enforcement of fiduciary duties.
Regarding the duty to take action to seek legal modification where appropriate, see supra
note 62 and accompanying text.
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donor intent." 123  Fiduciaries, moreover, "must be free to exercise their
judgment in the best interest of the organization," so there is necessarily
some room for managerial prerogative here. 124 But the precise parameters
of that prerogative are elusive. Consider this statement of principle put
forth by the ALI drafting committee:
A charity is considered to comply with a gift restriction if the charity acts
in good faith, reasonably construes the terms of the restriction, adheres to
all material requirements of the restriction, and seeks relief under §430
[referencing UMIFA, cy pres, and equitable deviation] . . . when
appropriate. 125
The first part of this principle (good faith, reasonableness) suggests
managerial leeway reflective of a corporate standard of care; the second
clause (must adhere, seek relief) imposes the more rigid trust law approach.
Both statements have merit, and the overriding principle appears sound. As
to guidance, however, given that the drafters set forth the two clauses in the
same statement of principle, the degree of managerial discretion courts will
accept before finding abuse appears to be an open question. In addition to
reasonableness and good faith, the answer to this question will likely
depend upon the level of specificity the donor has provided, the proffered
interpretation, and other circumstances, including those surrounding the
charity's conduct in relation to the restriction. 126
1. The Princeton Interpretation
In the Princeton matter, the interpretive question is whether the donors
intended their gift to be directed towards the education and training of
students for government service, or as the university asserts, for a much
broader array of public service options. 127 In this regard, Princeton's
123. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 410 reporter's note 1 (Preliminary Draft
No. 4, 2007). The previous draft stated that such board discretion might pertain with respect
to "construing" (versus "implementing") donor intent. See also Evelyn Brody, From the
Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 Ga. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 63, on file with author) (employing the language
from the previous ALI draft).
124. Fremont-Smith, supra note 57, at 201-09 (discussing leeway afforded in exercising
the duty of care); see also Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 460 cmt. b
(Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007) ("As a threshold matter, in carrying out the requirements of
a restricted gift, the charity will often have to exercise its judgment.").
125. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 425(a) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).
The drafters improved upon this language in 2007, though ambiguities remain due to the
inherent complexity of the issue. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 420(a)
(Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007) ("A charity complies with a gift restriction or condition if
the charity, acting in good faith, reasonably implements all material requirements of the
terms of the restriction or condition, and seeks relief under § 430 [referencing UMIFA, cy
pres, and equitable deviation] ... when appropriate.").
126. See Brody, supra note 57, at 644 ("[T]he fiduciaries must interpret [the
organization's charitable] purpose in light of settlor and donor instruction, but are otherwise
free to exercise their discretion.").
127. See supra note 118 for more on framing the issue in Robertson v. Princeton.
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assertion that the Robertsons envisioned a broader public service mission
aids the university on two important fronts. First, this broader interpretation
authorizes utilization of the Robertson gift to support a much more varied
basket of activities than would a gift intended to support educational
programs directed towards government service careers only. This broader
interpretation might, for example, authorize the support of professors and
programs much less directly tied to the Wilson School or its specific
curriculum. The justification would be that a stronger university
interdisciplinary program-of which the Wilson School is a part-enables
the recruitment of more intellectually diverse Wilson School faculty and
more student opportunities for research and interaction. 128  As the
Robertson family is quick to point out, however, the university's overall
mission is much broader than that described in the Robertson gift
documents in relation to the Wilson School. Specifically, according to the
Robertson family, the university is quite intent on freeing some of the
Robertson gift fund's $800 million to support more facets of the
university's overall mission in derogation of the Robertsons' original
intentions. 129 This represents a classic tension in the restricted gift context.
The second benefit to Princeton from this broader interpretation is that
the interpretation tends to moot criticisms that the university is not doing a
good job of carrying out the purposes underlying the Robertsons' gift. In
this regard, note that the Robertson family criticizes Princeton for placing
"[flewer than 12 percent of the school's graduates . . . in government
service" 13 0 -to which Princeton responds by emphasizing that the
"program sends between 40 to 50 percent of its students into the public
sector." 131 The university likewise touts having placed "about 87 percent of
[new] graduates with jobs ... in the public or nonprofit sector" during a
recent year.' 32 From the university's standpoint and in accordance with its
own interpretation, this represents stellar achievement in line with the
Robertsons' (more favorably construed) directives.
2. The Donors' Intent
As to which view more closely reflects the Robertsons' actual intent,
note that it is the donors' intentions at the time of the gift that govern. 133
Once the gift has been made, the donor no longer controls the property and
128. Princeton has said as much. See, e.g., id.
129. P1. Reply Mem., supra note 84, at 35.
130. Raj Hathiramani, Judge Allows Robertsons to Amend Complaint, DailyPrincetonian.com,
Oct. 15, 2004, http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/2004/10/15/news/I 11102.shtml.
131. Ross Urken, Wilson School Students Voice Opinions on Lawsuit, DailyPrincetonian.com,
Sept. 21, 2004, http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/2004/09/2 1/news/i 0784.shtml.
132. Mark Stefanski, Robertsons Poll About Endowment, DailyPrincetonian.com, Dec.
14, 2005, http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/2005/12/14/news/14138.shtml.
133. See, e.g., Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 450(a) cmt. a (Preliminary Draft
No. 4, 2007).
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thus subsequent changes of heart are not controlling. 134 Similarly, once a
gift and its terms have been accepted, the recipient organization may not
thereafter unilaterally change that gift's terms. 135 Still, subsequent dealings
between the recipient and the donor may shed light upon the proper
interpretation of ambiguous provisions.136
Princeton attempts to take advantage of this latter point by citing what it
characterizes as a pattern of donor acquiescence to university conduct
concerning the gift's purposes. Princeton argues that various post-gift
university announcements, mission statements, and correspondence
emphasize the public service nature of the Wilson School's mission.137
Princeton proceeds to assert that there were no donor objections to these
communications, thus confirming the alignment of university and donor
objectives. 138 If true, this is a relevant point, because prior to his death,
Charles Robertson took an active role as president of the foundation
charged with managing the gift. 139 He therefore had ample opportunity to
object to transgressions.
Among the items cited by the university is its own 1961 press release
announcing the gift. That announcement made no mention of government
service, opting instead to tout the Robertsons' support for "careers in public
and international affairs."' 40 Various other university correspondence and
mission statements with similar characterizations followed over the
years. 141 The nature and relevance of many of these happenings and the
existence of donor acquiescence are, however, no less debatable than the
underlying question of donor intent. 142  Indeed, if subsequent donor
acquiescence to such statements has any relevance, then so too should the
organization's efforts to solicit such acquiescence, or to avoid the issue
altogether.
In this regard, a more cynical view could easily cast the university's
original press release as merely the first of many instances showing that
Princeton was dissatisfied from the outset with the restrictive gift terms that
it had accepted. In fact, two past university executives appear to have
testified exactly to that effect. 143 The university president who negotiated
134. Although, the donor may have the authority to release a restriction. See supra note
63.
135. See supra Part III.B.
136. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 450 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 4,
2007).
137. See, e.g., Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 5-12; see also supra note 7.
138. See Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 5-12.
139. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
140. Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 10-11.
141. Id. at 5-23.
142. Many of the items cited in the defendant's memorandum could easily be viewed as
university statements consistent with Charles Robertson's steadfast commitment to
government service, a focus now suggested by the Robertson family. See Def. Mem., supra
note 83, at 12-23; Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77; see also supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
143. P1. Reply Mem., supra note 84, at 55.
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the gift, for example, testified in depositions that it "was unfortunate that
we allowed [the gift document] to be phrased as it was in this limited sense
of government service .... Eleven years later, the dean of the Wilson
School wrote the university president in preparation for an upcoming
meeting with the Robertson Foundation board. In that letter, the dean listed
among his objectives for the meeting a desire
[t]o obtain, either by explicit revision or interpretation effectively
negotiated with [the board] a broadened definition of those purposes of
the [Wilson] School which the [gift] supports-specifically . .. [that]
preparation of students for careers not only in the U.S. Federal
Government, but in... multilateral organizations, and in other public-
service and public-affairs-oriented capacities is consistent with the
purpose of the [gift]. 145
The university asserts that the Wilson School dean formulated these
objectives with correspondence from Charles Robertson in hand, and that
this somehow confirms the Robertsons' broader intent. 146 The university
further attempts to bolster its case by citing generic platitudes expressed by
Charles Robertson at a few post-gift events where his presence or words
were solicited. If this circuitous route to establishing donor intent has any
merit, however, then even more relevant should be Charles Robertson's
own direct correspondence with the university president that very same
year. In a 1972 dialogue with then-University President William G. Bowen
over the impact of the Vietnam War on student interest in government
service, for example, Charles Robertson is quoted as stating that "[f]ederal
government service concerned with international relations and affairs...
was our original goal. It continues to be our goal, and it emphatically
always will be our goal!"' 14 7
Moreover, the Wilson School dean ultimately shied away from directly
pursuing the gift purpose-broadening objective quoted above, thus
suggesting that the university was hesitant to raise the scope of purpose
issue directly. 14 8 More specifically, in the same letter setting forth Wilson
School objectives quoted above, the dean concluded, "My present judgment
is that we should not in this round try for an explicit change at the
[upcoming] meeting in the stated purposes of the [gift] along the lines
indicated .... ,"149 As if more insight were necessary, the dean of the
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (containing deposition testimony of President
Robert Goheen). President Goheen stated in his deposition, "[Wie were very trusting of one
another and we were not meticulous in our use of language.... [W]e were talking about
public service and not simply government service, and that was well-known... [and]
accepted.... [T]hat ambiguity I think has haunted us ever since. It's just too bad [the
restrictive language is] there." Memorandum to author, supra note 7, at 12.
145. Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 14 (emphasis omitted).
146. Id. at 13-14.
147. P1. Reply Mem., supra note 84, at 54; Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77.
148. Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 14.
149. Id.
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Wilson School also complained in another 1972 memo to the university
president:
'What bothers me' about the terms of the gift, ... is 'the unspoken
premise that, with respect to any American institution dealing in public
affairs, the highest per-se loyalty automatically must be to the U.S.
government .... The university should resist [such] a blind
commitment.. .,150
The implication, of course, is that the dean believed that (1) the donor's
expressed intentions were too narrow in the first instance, and (2) directly
raising the matter would not be productive in light of donor attitudes. Much
of Princeton's own evidence suggests an institutional belief that the
university had allowed itself to become shackled by the donors' gift
restrictions, and that getting around those restrictions was necessary, but
required finesse. The quoted conversations also demonstrate the
unavoidable interconnectedness inherent in the restricted gift life cycle-the
idea that what comes around, goes around. If it were indeed the case that
Princeton should avoid a "blind commitment" to gearing a particular
school's curriculum towards government service, did this only become
apparent a mere eleven years after Princeton accepted the gift and its
documented terms? And if apparent at the time of gift, why then did
Princeton officials not insist upon more clearly permissive language and a
more direct statement of this broader intent at the time the gift was
accepted?151  Could it be that Princeton feared a choice between
fastidiously guarding its mission integrity and managerial discretion,
perhaps at the cost of losing a very significant gift, and thus instead
conceded some (too much?) of that discretion to a generous donor? In light
of the duties attendant upon both managing an organization's overall
mission and overseeing a restricted gift, thinking about such matters surely
falls within the realm of fiduciary responsibilities to be adhered to in
accepting the gift. In this vein, nonprofit leadership has an obligation to
refuse any such overly controlling or off-mission-directed gift, however
immediately painful that might seem. Princeton's ultimate failing-if such
a failing is believed to exist-can be traced to the very act of accepting gift
terms that would thereafter so confound university leadership in seeking to
advance the university's (and perhaps the Wilson School's) broader
mission.
150. Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77 (quoting a 1972 Princeton internal memo); see
also P1. Reply Mem., supra note 84, at 19-2 1. The past Princeton president who negotiated
the gift reports that John F. Kennedy's "ask not what your country can do for you" speech
inspired the gift, thus bolstering the claim that the Robertsons possessed a particular desire to
support federal government service. Hechinger & Golden, supra note 77.
151. See in this regard the deposition testimony of former University President Goheen,
quoted in supra note 144 and accompanying text. If nothing else, President Goheen's
testimony shows that unstated understandings that supplant detail in the gift negotiation
documentation can lead to significant problems, and legal disputes, over time. See also
Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 420 cmt. b(2) (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007)
(discussing consequences of "imprecise or poorly-thought-through restrictions").
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B. Literal Restrictions, Changed Circumstances, and Cy Pres
Missing from the analysis thus far is a discussion of cy pres and equitable
deviation. Cy pres and equitable deviation are the primary "orthodox"
routes to dealing with problematic donor restrictions. 152 Because the cy
pres power is the most sweeping of the two, in that it permits a change in
gift purpose (not just administration), the cy pres doctrine will be the focus
here. 153
The doctrine of cy pres empowers a court to direct the application of
contributed property to charitable purposes that differ from those originally
specified by the donor. 154 Courts have traditionally applied the doctrine
only where it has become "impossible, impracticable or illegal" to carry out
the donor's original charitable purpose. 155 Where such a failure exists, a
court can "save" the charitable nature of the gift by directing its application
to an alternative charitable use that falls "as near as possible" to that
152. Atkinson, supra note 68, at 31-33. The characterization of "orthodox" is to be
contrasted with what Professor Atkinson calls the "unorthodox" or "low road" to dealing
with such directives, the latter reference being to the more unilateral interpretive (or
"disregard") approach discussed in Part VI.A.
153. The traditional difference between cy pres and equitable deviation is that cy pres
presents a more narrowly invoked, but more sweeping, power to alter the actual charitable
purpose of a gift (traditionally described as a "substantive" deviation). In contrast, equitable
deviation provides a more liberally applied, but narrower, power to deviate not from the
charitable purpose itself, but from particular donor directions relating to carrying out that
charitable purpose (traditionally described as a departure from an "administrative" term). As
applied, equitable deviation and cy pres can be difficult to distinguish, and courts often
confuse the two doctrines (either out of ignorance or perhaps as a skillful route to gift
modification where one or the other of the doctrines is needed, but its criteria have not been
satisfied). See ABA Comm. on Charitable Trusts and Found., Cy Pres and Deviation:
Current Trends in Application, 8 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 391, 398-403 (1973) (noting
judicial confusion in applying doctrines); Johnson, supra note 15, at 376, 379-80 ("The
distinction between cy pres and equitable deviation is specious [and] without merit .... );
Roger G. Sisson, Comment, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Grip: Charitable Efficiency and the
Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 Va. L. Rev. 635, 645 (1988) ("[Clourts have used the deviation
doctrine to yield results that resemble modifications of purpose under the cy pres doctrine,
and vice versa."). The most recent ALl draft, however, retains the distinction between the
doctrines, granting more managerial leeway where equitable deviation is implicated. See
Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 440 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007).
154. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 (2003); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399
(1957). The doctrine applies only where property is initially dedicated to some charitable
purpose. For recent scholarly commentary on the topic of cy pres, see Buckles, supra note 2
(discussing cy pres in specific context of restricted gifts and proposing a tax-code based
solution to problems presented); Eisenstein, supra note 44.
155. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399. Section 399 states the traditional cy pres
trigger as "a particular charitable purpose [that] becomes impossible or impracticable or
illegal to carry out." To apply the doctrine, the court must also find that "the settlor
manifested a more general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes." More
recent Restatement and Uniform Trust Code articulations of the doctrine have added the
impediment of a purpose becoming "wasteful" to the circumstances that justify application
of the doctrine, though that criterion had generally been rejected under prior law as too
liberal. See Unif. Trust Code § 413, 7C U.L.A. 509 (2003); Restatement (Third) of Trusts §
67; Fremont-Smith, supra note 57, at 177-78.
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originally chosen by the donor. 156 Traditionally, however, a court would
not utilize this doctrine unless the donor possessed a "general charitable
intent" such that donor intent would in fact be furthered by dedicating the
funds to some purpose similar to the donor's now-failed charitable
purpose. 15
7
Generalizations begin to fail here, however, as modem formulations of
the doctrine have resulted in meaningful departures from the strict or
traditional form of cy pres (which still governs in a large number of
states). 158 Both the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust
Code (UTC) now presume the existence of general charitable intent. 159
These more recent formulations add the impediment of a purpose becoming
"wasteful" to the circumstances that justify a change of donor purpose via
application of cy pres-a criterion generally rejected under prior law as
being too liberal. 160 Both new pronouncements also relax the "as near as
possible" application of the gift property upon judicial modification, instead
accepting an application that "reasonably approximates" or is "consistent
with" the donor's stated purposes. 161
The laws of either New Jersey or Delaware will govern the Princeton
dispute. 162 Neither of these states has adopted the UTC, nor is there any
affirmative indication as to whether the courts of either state will embrace
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts formulation of cy pres. Even without
such doctrinal liberalizations, however, a central question underlying the
availability of judicial modification in any cy pres matter is whether
circumstances have changed since the date of the gift such that the gift
terms can no longer be carried out as stated. In the context of the Princeton
dispute, a logical inquiry therefore concerns the question of what, if
anything, changed after the date of the Robertson gift that might render the
156. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399 (noting that the alternative charitable use
should be "as near as possible" to the donor's original scheme); Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 67 cmt. a (articulating an "as near as possible" standard for the alternative charitable
use).
157. The Restatements and other articulations of the cy pres rule make this clear. See
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 cmt. b & reporter's notes; Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 399; see also Craft v. Shroyer, 74 N.E.2d 589, 592-93 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947);
Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1117-18 (discussing this requirement and what it means in terms
of a donor's desired course of action where the original charitable objective fails); Venessa
Laird, Phantom Selves: The Search for a General Charitable Intent in the Application of Cy
Pres Doctrine, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 973, 978 (1987) (reducing the inquiry to ascertaining which
of two outcomes a donor preferred).
158. See, e.g., Fremont-Smith, supra note 57, at 175-79.
159. See generally id.
160. See Unif. Trust Code § 413, 7C U.L.A. 509; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67.
161. Unif. Trust Code § 413, 7C U.L.A. 509; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67.
Although a gift over or reversion upon failure of the donor's purposes traditionally negated
the availability of cy pres modification, the new Uniform Trust Code formulation ignores
such reversions unless the reversion favors a living settlor or otherwise is implicated within
twenty-one years of the gift. Unif. Trust Code § 413(b), 7C U.L.A. 509.
162. The Robertson Foundation is a Delaware corporation, and Princeton is located in
New Jersey.
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literal gift terms problematic-and what might this suggest about the need
for, or propriety of, a "reincarnation" of the Robertsons' gift.
In this regard and as to the entire matter of judicial modification,
Princeton's defense filings are interesting. For one thing, relevant changes
have, in fact, occurred since the 1961 gift. In particular, the educational and
professional environment directly relevant to the Robertson gift terms has
evolved. Princeton plausibly argued during the 1970s that the Vietnam War
and the Watergate scandal dampened student desire to pursue careers in
government service. 163 Princeton also accurately notes that today, many
formerly federal government functions are filled by nongovernmental
organizations and other public service-oriented organizations. The
university points to such things as the "evolution of the context in which
the... Wilson School... sought to carry out [its] mission." 164  The
Robertsons also had a clear affinity for Princeton, as opposed to preferring a
reversion to heirs or some other entity upon failure of the gift. 65
Despite these favorable facts, Princeton has chosen to forego any judicial
authorization for cy pres modification or after-the-fact ratification of
Princeton's potentially overly broad, unilateral interpretation of the gift
terms. 166 Princeton has instead chosen to hinge its fate on the acceptability
of its "managerial" interpretation of the Robertson gift terms. Perhaps
Princeton views the two as mutually exclusive-i.e., that seeking (or even
suggesting) cy pres modification confirms that the university's broader
interpretation is beyond the scope of the donor's originally expressed intent,
and thus beyond the power of managerial prerogative. In fact, Princeton
expressly (though incorrectly) argues in its court filings that the cy pres
doctrine cannot apply in this case because a charitable corporation (and not
any technical trust) is involved. 167
Perhaps Princeton has taken this position because of the unpredictability
inherent in any application for cy pres relief and the judicial mandate that
might result. More likely, though, is that Princeton hopes to establish that it
should not be held to any heightened "trust" fiduciary duties with respect to
the Robertsons' gift or the university's actions in carrying out the gift terms.
163. Perhaps this answers the question posed in the text accompanying supra notes 150-
51 regarding how drastically circumstances affecting the gift may have changed in only
eleven years from the date of the gift.
164. Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 16.
165. The Robertson family does not seek a reversion of funds to themselves. The
Robertson family does seek to remove control of the foundation from Princeton and, as
Princeton is quick to emphasize, thereafter place such control in the hands of the Robertson
family, to pursue the alleged donor intentions via other universities. See, e.g., Robert K.
Durkee, Vice President and Sec'y of Princeton Univ., Letter to the Editor, Pitt. Trib., Mar.
22, 2007, at A8. With regard to the sought-after removal of Princeton control and benefit,
see the text accompanying supra notes 94-98.
166. Such after-the-fact ratification may be had under trust law principles. See Principles
of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. §§ 460 cmt. d, 470 cmt. d (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007).
167. Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 69-74. In this regard, recall again that trust-like duties,
and therefore trust doctrines like cy pres, should apply where a restricted gift purpose is at
issue. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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As a result, Princeton has apparently decided to absolutely resist any efforts
by the Robertson family plaintiffs to invoke trust doctrine.' 68 This again
implicates the ongoing evolution in nonprofit law from trust to corporate
fiduciary standards, and the complicated task of defining boundaries where
restricted gifts are involved.
Despite eschewing direct applicability of the doctrine, Princeton
nevertheless employs the cy pres-type analysis in defending its own
utilization of the Robertsons' gift.169 Perhaps Princeton emphasizes the
changed circumstances in an effort to lend credence to Princeton's claims
that it is acting quite reasonably in pursuing the Robertsons' purposes-
suggesting a quest for acceptance of its good faith in interpreting the gift
terms in the spirit of cy pres.' 70 Princeton may also fear that (as the
Robertson family alleges) other schools currently have no trouble placing
large numbers of their graduates into government service positions. If true,
and accepting the Robertson plaintiffs' interpretation of donor intent, such
placement success belies Princeton's claim that market forces, rather than
its own inability or unwillingness, underlie the lack of Wilson School
graduates going directly into government service positions upon graduation.
Such a reality would also likely preclude a court's finding that fulfilling the
gift terms (as construed by the Robertson family) has become "impossible"
or "impractical." 7 1
CONCLUSION
Going beyond the Robertson v. Princeton dispute, I would like to
conclude with a few additional thoughts about the restricted gift life cycle
and the interconnectedness of decisions and outcomes across the life span
of a restricted gift, with a particular focus on the trend towards a more
liberalized cy pres doctrine. These doctrinal liberalizations will
undoubtedly alter judicial decision making, though at what pace remains
168. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part VI.A.
169. Def. Mem., supra note 83, at 13-23 ("[The University remained committed to
fulfilling the Foundation's mission, but the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and the
negative public image of government had dramatically changed the environment in which
the Woodrow Wilson School operated and the changing nature of public service had affected
[the nature of government service].").
170. See supra note 125 and accompanying text, regarding good faith.
171. Since neither the Uniform Trust Code nor the Restatement (Third) of Trusts are in
effect in Delaware or New Jersey, Princeton could not argue that the "wasteful" trigger for
cy pres application has occurred. As to the "wasteful" trigger, see supra note 160 and
accompanying text. That is too bad, because the Princeton dispute could be viewed as
raising issues similar to those encountered in the case of Berryl Buck. The Buck gift
ballooned from approximately $10 million to over $380 million, thus prompting the
foundation board charged with administering the gift to seek a judicial broadening of the gift
purposes on grounds of efficiency. That effort was denied, though the case provides ample
fodder for discussion of a "wasteful" trigger for cy pres. See, e.g., Principles of the Law of'
Nonprofit Orgs. § 240 reporter's note 5 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005) (discussing the Buck
trust case). It should be obvious at this point that both parties in the Princeton dispute would
take issue with this characterization.
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unclear. Such liberalization should also influence nonjudicial decision
making. Interaction with the state attorney general-the primary party
charged with enforcing the organization's compliance with its fiduciary
duties-is just one example.
In this regard, the more liberal doctrinal acceptance of modifying donor
directives should "grease the wheels" when it comes to the recipient
organization's dealings with the state attorney general. The "grease" comes
in the form of the new starting premise; namely, that the donor possessed a
general charitable intent notwithstanding her specific directives. This
premise, plus the addition of a "wasteful" trigger for invoking cy pres,
should also make the prospect of "tweaking" dead-hand controls less
offensive and less likely to generate a public backlash (both an
organizational and attorney general concern).
Once a modification trigger is reached, moreover, negotiations should
also proceed more favorably by virtue of the wider latitude granted by the
"reasonably approximates" versus traditional "as near as possible" wording
of the permissible modifications. The organization's proposals for
alternative uses of the restricted assets may thus appear more palatable to an
attorney general when considering the state's position on a proposed change
in the use of restricted charitable assets. This prospect, in turn, should
reduce the need for organizational management to take an aggressive stance
in its own unilateral interpretation and implementation of the donor's
restrictions, particularly as identifiable changed circumstances begin to
heighten the motivations for doing just that.
From a donor's perspective, the noted doctrinal liberalization might
solidify the move towards evermore detailed donor-charity gift agreements.
From the recipient organization's perspective, these doctrinal liberalizations
should inspire more concentrated efforts to incorporate some endorsement
of the organization's broader mission into the donor's statement of
purposes-even where all parties agree that a more limited purpose is the
primary objective. Such efforts are both consistent with managerial
fiduciary responsibilities and could later-in the face of changed
circumstances-serve to open many otherwise restrictive doors by
permitting a court to find confirmation that a donor looked favorably upon
the recipient organization and its broader mission. It thus seems clear that
in the end, decisions must reflect the gift's beginnings, and in the
beginning, decision makers must contemplate the gift's potential end.
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